PenguinBooks, New York and London, London Forward by B. Liddle Hart, Introduction by Martin Blumenson. Hppocrene Books, New York p. New York, NY p. The Viking Press, New York, Leave a comment. Filed under crime , ethics , History , holocaust , Military , nazi germany , Political Commentary , world war two in europe. Tagged as adolf hitler , einsatzgruppen , erich von manstein , franz halder , general johannes blaskowitz , German war in Poland , heinrich himmler , ordungspolizei , Reinhard Heydrich , totenkopf battlaions , werner von brauchitsch , wilhelm canaris.
Many people have no understanding that genocide does not appear in a vacuum. At its core it require a base and evil race hatred. But it needs to be backed by the appearance of law to be accepted, and is helped when there is a military doctrine that supports it, and a military willing to assist in carrying it out, or whose officers look the other way. This is the next installment of my article on war crimes, genocide and the role of ordinary people in them.
This focuses on the legal, ideological, and military doctrine foundations of the German race war in Poland and Russia. Without these foundations it would have been difficult, maybe even impossible for the Germans to implement genocide on such a vast scale. This study will focus on the German policy of ideological-racial war in Poland and Russia. Likewise, the many military personnel shared the basic prejudices that per meated Nazi racial ideology and politics.
Starvation was a population control measure that supplemented other forms of annihilation. Military Doctrine and Ideology. These factors were often, consciously or unconsciously, excluded from early histories of World War II. While Liddell-Hart might be excused by lack of knowledge of some German army atrocities he could not have been ignorant.
It was not just the SS who he blamed the atrocities, but many of the men who he interviewed. In doing this Liddell-Hart and others presented a myth as truth. Germany had a long running history of anti-Semitism before Hitler. Wehrmacht Members giving Weapons instruction to Hitler Youth. Field Marshal Walter Von Brauchtisch. Along with cultural anti-Semitism and the Nazification of German thought in the s, there were aspects of military doctrine which helped prepare the way for the eastern campaign.
Treatment Of Partisans. Because of this our conduct of the war finally achieved a harshness that we deplored, but which we could not avoid. Civil War.
- Hitlers Fieldmarshalls.
- Il Ritorno Che Non Volevo (Italian Edition).
- IMT testimony of Erich von Manstein - Axis History Forum.
If captured, they may suffer death, whether they rise singly, in small or large bands, and whether called upon to do so by their own, but expelled, government or not. They are not prisoners of war; nor are they if discovered and secured before their conspiracy has matured to an actual rising or armed violence. The German Army adapted that code and incorporated it in its doctrine for dealing with partisans. This was employed in the Southwest Africa German colonies.
Lothar Von Trotha. When the Herero resisted Von Trotha ordered that they be exterminated. But most of them died without violence. The Germans simply drove them out into the desert and sealed off the border. Translated by David Irving.
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German edition published by Musterschmnidt-Verlad, Gottigen p. Originally published in Great Britain by. See Taylor, Fred, Editor and Translator. Translated by R. The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality. Translated by Deborah Lucas Schneider. Copyright by B. Liddell-Hart p. The time was also around the beginning of the Cold War and the Berlin Blockade when many American and British leaders were trying to end the war crimes trials and bring the West Germans into the new anti-Communist alliance.
Translated by J. Maxwell, Brownjohn. Cooper Square Press,New York Originally published by C. Canaris would later protest the Kristalnacht to Keitel p. Revised and Enlarged Edition. Potomac Books Inc. Washington, DC p. Peter Paret, editor. Presidio Press, Novato CA Group, New York, First published by Greenhill Books pp. It is interesting to note that Rauss does not describe any actual anti-partisan operation.
Filed under ethics , History , holocaust , laws and legislation , Military , nazi germany , Political Commentary , world war one , world war two in europe. Tagged as adolf eichmann , adolf hitler , B. Liddell-Hart , criminal order , einsatzgruppen , erich von manstein , fraco-prussian war , franc-tireurs , franco-prussian war , franz halder , franz lieber , german anti-semitism , herero , lebensraum , lieber code , lothar von trotha , OKW , prussian ettapen , von moltke , Waffen SS , Walter von Brauchtisch , wehrmacht , werner von brauchitsch , wilhelm canaris , wilhem keitel.
In the ruins of Stalingrad lay most of his Army. Around 90, survivors surrendered in the coming days to the Red Army.
Of the Germans taken prisoner, only about 5, returned home. Most were to die of their wounds, or of diseases, maltreatment, and starvation in Soviet Camps between and when the bulk of the survivors were released. Paulus, born in joined the Imperial Army in and served on the Western Front in the First World War, finishing the war as a Captain and after serving in. Freikorps was retained as one of the 4, officers in the new Reichsheer.
He served as a staff officer and company commander, and briefly commanded a battalion. He would also serve on the staff which developed the new Panzer Forces for the Wehrmacht. An apolitical professional he was not a Nazi but considered Hitler:. He considered him a genius. In this capacity he served as one of the principle planners of Operation Barbarossa. When he brought home maps and documents related to Barbarossa she again protested to him. When he ignored her she said:. In December the German Offensive ground to a halt at the gates of Moscow and a devastating Red Army counterattack created a crisis in the Wehrmacht which was completely unprepared for the Russian Winter.
Only heroic resistance and improvisation by German units and the still imperfect application of operational warfare kept saved the German front. Battles continued throughout the winter, the lines stabilized and both sides planned for the coming year. During the winter debacle Hitler had sacked many commanders which left many vacancies. The two men were nothing alike and Paulus had never commanded more than a battalion, and not in combat, but six days later the athletic Reichenau suffered a heart attack and suffered a head injury during a medical evacuation flight back to Germany.
Paulus also forbade cooperation with the Einsatzgruppen death squads, which Reichenau had gone out of his way to support. Paulus did well in his first combat with the Red Army, when it attempted to disrupt the coming German offensive at Kharkov as Sixth Army encircled and captured over , Soviet troops. Paulus commanded it well but became involved in the battle for Stalingrad, and Hitler would not let him quit, and promoted him to Colonel General. Likewise, unknown to Hitler and his commanders, Stalin knew of Operation Blau and observing the German movements decided to turn Stalingrad into a fortress.
He conducted a strategic withdraw to preserve his forces, allowing the Germans to advance further into the Caucasus and divide their armies, leaving the flanks of the Sixth Army protected by pathetically equipped Italian, Romanian, and Hungarian armies which could not match the manpower, mobility, or firepower of the Red Army. Stalin allowed the German Army Group South to advance, and allowed Sixth Army to battle street by street, building by building, factory by factory to capture Stalingrad.
Paulus allowed the Soviets to maintain their defense by not cutting the Red Army defenders in the city off from the Volga, even not taking action to link up with the Fourth Panzer Army which under its commander Hermann Hoth had broken through the Soviet front south of the Stalingrad when the opportunity presented itself. The operation totally surprised the Germans and in four days time the Sixth Army went from the spearhead of the German assault to an army cut off and surrounded by a Soviet Army Group.
The Italian, Hungarian, and Romanian armies on its flanks were shattered. Plans were made to relieve the Sixth Army but they depended on the Sixth Army attacking out to meet the relief forces from the Fourth Panzer Army. But the handwriting was on the wall. German Forces to the south were having to extricate themselves from an even bigger encirclement.
The superb generalship of Field Marshal Erich Von Manstein prevented a complete disaster and inflicted a compelling defeat on the Red Army, but the Sixth Army was doomed. Paulus asked permission to surrender which was denied by Hitler. There is no possibility to close the gap … All provisions are used up. Over twelve thousand unattended [wounded] men in the pocket. What orders am I to issue to the troops, who have no ammunition left? However, the troops still have faith in their commanders. Who is the man responsible for declaring that it was possible?
Had someone told me it was not possible, I should not have held it against the Luftwaffe. I could have broken out. When I was strong enough to do so. Now it is too late. Paulus radioed Hitler for permission to surrender, empathetically stating the conditions in the pocket. No food, no medicine, no ammunition, no fuel; only to be denied again. The words of the Reichsmarschal fell hollow on the ears of the doomed men:. The enemy is tough, but the German soldier has grown tougher. They, too, stood to the last. May our battle be an example to the present and coming generations, that they must never capitulate even in a hopeless situation, for then Germany will come out victorious.
But it was a lie. Less than 24 hours later on January 31st with Red Army tanks and troops outside his command bunker, Paulus surrendered, just hours after Hitler promoted him to Field Marshal. The promotion was supposed to encourage Paulus to commit suicide as no German Field Marshal had ever surrendered his army. January 31, — 7. It was still dark but day was dawning almost imperceptibly. Paulus was asleep. It was some time before I could break out of the maze of thoughts and strange dreams that depressed me so greatly.
I was going to get up quietly when someone knocked at the door. Paulus awoke and sat up. It was the HQ commander. The rank of field marshal has been conferred upon you. The dispatch came early this morning — it was the last one. The general announced that we were his prisoners. I placed my revolver on the table. Paulus surrendered, and did not commit suicide. In the next few days the other isolated pockets of German resistance surrendered as well.
Roughly 95, Germans, Italians, and Romanians surrendered at Stalingrad. Fewer than 6, would return home after nearly a decade of imprisonment and forced labor. Hitler ranted about the treason and cowardice of Paulus, and his lackeys in the military agreed. Paulus should have shot himself and the garrison formed a hedgehog and resisted to the last bullet. Though he surrendered Paulus did not give support to the Soviets or the German resistance until he learned of the execution of his Friend Field Marshal Erich von Witzleben and others for their participation in the attempt to kill Hitler.
After the war he testified at the Nuremberg Trials admitting German conduct of the war in the east was criminal but refusing to label men like Wilhelm Keitel, and Afred Jodl as war criminals. He took up a position as the civilian chief for military history for the new East German Government. He died on February 1st , having never seen his wife since he left to take command of Sixth Army in January , she died in His son Alexander was killed at Anzio in His other son, Ernst, survived the war and committed suicide in Without mentioning any names, Americans who worship at the cult of Trump should pay heed.
Filed under History , holocaust , leadership , Military , nazi germany , Political Commentary , world war two in europe. Tonight I am posting what was a paper for one of my Masters degree classes dealing with the German summer offensive, Operation Blau, which ended when the Red Army began its counter-offensive on November 18th The German offensive ended in a disastrous defeat at Stalingrad which could have been even worse had it not been for the superb improvisation of Field Marshal Erich Von Manstein who extricated the rest of Army Group South from the Caucasus and stuck a counterblow that halted the Soviet advance.
Following the Soviet winter offensive and the near disaster in front of Moscow the German High Command was faced with the strategic decision of what to do in the campaign. Several options were considered and it was decided to seize the Caucasus oilfields and in the process capture or neutralize the city of Stalingrad on the Volga. However, the German High Command was divided on the actual objectives of the campaign. They believed that the advance into the Caucasus was to be a blocking effort.
As far as his Generals were concerned it was little more than a name on the map. The capture of the city was not considered necessary. In Moscow Stalin and his Generals attempted to guess the direction of the impending German offensive. With this in mind the Red Army attempted to disrupt the German offensive and to attempt to recover the key city of Kharkov. The Red Army launched three offensives against the Germans under the direction of Stavka. The largest of these, an attempt to take Kharkov was defeated between May with the loss of most of the armor in southern Russia.
The heavy losses meant that the Red Army would face the German offensive in a severely weakened condition. It also had three allied armies, the Italian 8th Army, the 2nd Hungarian, and 4th Romanian. These forces operated in the northern part of the operational area. The allied armies which had few armored or motorized forces and little heavy artillery were being depended on to filled the gaps that the Germans could no longer fill with their own troops. The reliance on these units would prove to be a key factor in the German defeat. Army Group B provided the main effort and its offensive quickly smashed through the defending Soviet armies.
He protested and was relieved of command by Hitler. Von Bock was replaced by Von Weichs which created a difficult command and control problem. He defends the infamous "Commissar Order" by stating 'On the contrary, they were - without being soldiers - fanatical fighters, but fighters whose activities could only be regarded as illegal according to the traditional meaning of warfare'.
The growth of partisans behind the German is similarly whitewashed. Von Manstein maintains where rear area administration was in the hands of the German Army there was not partisan activity.
Erich von Manstein - Wikipedia
The role of the notorious Reich Commissioner Koch in the development of extensive partisan activity in the Ukraine is given all of a sentence: " The, other, however was that the rule of Reich Commissioner Koch had driven the population straight into their arms". This appeared by the way, not in the main body of the text, but in a footnote. The same footnote goes on to discuss in further depth the different types of partisans and where they were geographically based. Not a word about the extermination squads, the wholesale round-ups of the people for the concentration camps, etc.
Even allowing for the era this was written this is a surprising and somewhat shocking omission. Von Manstein never forthrightly condemns those atrocities or the individuals involved. Throughout the book he takes swipes and Goring and Koch but never faces the issue of German mistreatment head-on. Instead from nebulous comments here and there one has the impression that Von Manstein found those actions distasteful somewhat like an aristocrat reacting to an unpleasant odor in a distracted manner but ultimately unworthy of his notice.
It ends up lessening and tarnishing the image and reputation of one of the most brilliant of the German generals in World War 2. May 29, Drew rated it it was amazing. A fascinating and objective account of one of the Reich's greatest generals. Beginning with the preparations for the invasion of Poland in , Manstein relates his wartime experiences in great detail, ending with his dismissal in the spring of Of particular interest was his assessment of Hitler's character generally negative, noting his over-reliance on Nietzsch-ian willpower, new technology, and confidence in sycophants like Goring, but also his positive aspects, as occasionally he was A fascinating and objective account of one of the Reich's greatest generals.
Of particular interest was his assessment of Hitler's character generally negative, noting his over-reliance on Nietzsch-ian willpower, new technology, and confidence in sycophants like Goring, but also his positive aspects, as occasionally he was a decent tactician. The numerous battle maps will help the reader understand the troop movements Manstein describes. There was a very long but riveting chapter describing the Battle of Stalingrad which kept me on the edge of my seat.
Each time he implored Hitler to let them break out of the pocket he met with refusal, which led to the surrender of the 6th Army. By the campaigns, it was apparent how desparate the situation on the Eastern Front had become. There was a translator's note at the end of my edition which said that there were numerous personal and sentimental passages which were removed in the English-language editions. I wish these had not been taken out, as I would have been keen to read them.
So much of the book is high-level tactics and grand strategy, so personal touches would have helped the book to read more evenly. I would have been very interested in his thoughts about the final year of the war, in which he was on the sidelines. A field marshal forced to watch his country slowly enveloped by the enemy must have been hard to endure. Additionally, I would have liked him to discuss his experience at the Nuremberg trials, but that would have made the book overly long and outside the scope of the topic.
I highly recommend this book not only as a study in military history and strategy, but to he how 'the other side' lived and fought in that titanic struggle. Sep 20, Pieter rated it it was amazing Shelves: militair. It ought to be like that. But Field Marshal Erich von Manstein leads the reader into the war rooms during the period , explaining how certain decisions were made and why.
Manstein was the man who came up with the idea of the attack through the Ardennes and Sedan to conquer France. He was the hero of the Crimea forcing the Germans up to the Causasus. Any Luftwaffe support was too little, too late. The required armies to break the encirclement never reached on time. The scope of the book lasts until the removal of Manstein as chief of the Army Group acting in the South of the Soviet Union. A German defeat in the East was never the way it was meant to be if only… This book was an interesting perspective from one of the best German Generals.
What I found fascinating was he often faced decisions where there were no good options. Indeed, Manstein, from a military perspective chose the least worst option throughout much of the campaign on the Eastern Front. Further, the dialogue between Hitler and Manstein brings to light how a leader inept in policy and strategic decision making can lead to defeat on the battlefield.
Manstein makes little to zero note on th This book was an interesting perspective from one of the best German Generals. Manstein makes little to zero note on the evils of the Nazi regime, keeping the writing strictly to military decisions at the operational level. Mar 11, Zhang Tao rated it liked it. Manstein was famous for "Manstein plan" which was used to take the battle of France in WWII, he was widely considered the best general in his time, and this book provides a lot of details of this thinking of the war, and his struggle with Hitler's inner circle.
The lesson is, a dictator, will more likely to listen to whoever he considers royal to him always saying yes , not whoever has the best ideas, especially when the time i 3 of 3 books this month on 3 most famous Germany's generals in WWII. The lesson is, a dictator, will more likely to listen to whoever he considers royal to him always saying yes , not whoever has the best ideas, especially when the time it gets tough and he feel his authority is getting challenged. Apr 18, Sumit Pokhrel rated it it was amazing. As a student of second world war for last 15 years, I felt this autobiography gives a detail account of how a dictatorial whim of an incompetent political leadership plagued by greed and lust of power led to serious strategic blunders that ultimately cost Wehrmacht the war.
Hats off to the master tactician who always fought against overwhelming numerical odds and pulled off the impossibles - especially Third battle of Kharkov and Battle of Crimea. Aug 01, John Walton rated it really liked it. Fascinating insight from a man who was there when it happened, that said a lot of Manstein's words involve plenty of blame shifting for Germany's fortunes during the war - mistakes made by the OKW such as the infamous Halt Order at Dunkirk were often wrongly attributed to Hitler it was in fact Army Group A commander Gerd von Rundstedt who pushed for the halt, with Hitler merely validating the order many hours later.
Aside from that, a compelling read. Jun 03, Razvan Banciu rated it really liked it. The only thing that impedes a maximal mark is the technical part of the book, which makes it rather difficult for the usual reader. None the less, this is the most valuable argument that makes Lost Victories a matter of study for those who try to understand mechanisms of war.
So, a interesting book, but also a hard one to deal with. Sep 25, Mac rated it it was amazing. Likely Germany's most intelligent general. The Allies should be thankful he did not have the power to run the war. Jan 12, Damien Angelet rated it did not like it. I got a little bored. I found it too apologetical: 'Hitler was wrong, and not the army'. Yet I might be wrong. Feb 20, Ashok rated it liked it. It would have given depth to him and maybe more sense of the man, after all it is his memoir. Nov 29, Steven Peterson rated it really liked it.
Manstein's "Lost Victories" has value for the reader for at least two different reasons. Two, it is an intriguing, unself-conscious reflection on good people carrying out their tasks for the worst possible causes in this case, Adolf Hitler's horrific vision of a Third Reich. As Martin Blumenson notes in his "Introduction" pages : "The tragedy for all thoughtful, knowledgeable, and sensitiv Manstein's "Lost Victories" has value for the reader for at least two different reasons. As Martin Blumenson notes in his "Introduction" pages : "The tragedy for all thoughtful, knowledgeable, and sensitive soldiers like Manstein was the dilemma of trying faithfully to serve their country while disapproving the Fuehrer's aims and methods.
True to their tradition of obedience, most of them, again like Manstein, kept their gaze unswervingly on the military role they were expected to play even as they deplored the growing vacuum of direction at the political top. Liddell Hart, in his "Foreword," speaks of Manstein's career well. And, finally, Manstein, in his "Author's Preface," oddly enough speaks to Blumenson's comment when he notes that page 17 : "This book is the personal narrative of a soldier, in which I have deliberately refrained from discussing political problems with no direct bearing in the military field.
This shows a blindness, amply commented upon by many others, of German generals. The book itself focuses largely on Manstein's military experiences. Perhaps the most telling descriptions are the foolish strategy dictated from Hitler of attacking the Soviet Union on a far too broad front, given the limited military resources of the German army. There is great poignancy in Manstein's recalling the desperate situation in Stalingrad, as General Paulus followed Hitler's stupid order to defend at all costs.
There is poignancy in his depiction of German troops and tanks fighting far superior Soviet armies to a standstill, before they would have to, ultimately, retreat before overpowering odds. And, in this context, of Hitler's orders not to retreat, despite the desperate strategic situation in which the German forces found themselves.
A fascinating commentary from a central actor in the German military. This book is usefully read in conjunction with the work by Heinz Guderian, "Panzer Leader. And their inability to see that fundamental disconnect. Oct 16, James rated it it was amazing Shelves: ww2. After Manstein became an Army group commander, he had many meeting with Hitler, often the 2 of them alone.
The most sober and realistic account I've read. Few of the people who've written about Hitler ever met him, let alone often. And for Manstein it was almost always him trying to change Hitlers mind and only occasionally succeeding. There were a number of details in the book that I haven't seen elsewhere and were very helpful After Manstein became an Army group commander, he had many meeting with Hitler, often the 2 of them alone.
There were a number of details in the book that I haven't seen elsewhere and were very helpful in understanding what happened on the Russian Front. Much talk about how the airlift to troops at Stalingrad failed, Manstein details how many pounds of cargo the German planes could carry. I had no idea it was so little.
Just a few thousand pounds, nothing like modern jets. Also, as the Russians advanced they'd put all the people they "liberated" to work. All the men under age 60 were given a rifle and put on the front line, everyone else helped with supplies or food prep. I'd read elsewhere the average life expectancy of a Soviet soldier on the front line was only 13 days. With no training it's not surprising. I also wondered if the German general of the sixth army was a closet communist and deliberately took actions that led to the capture of the sixth army.
He wouldn't let anyone try. Also after WW2, he didn't go to live in west Germany like all or almost all other generals, he lived in east Germany till his death. Dec 24, Lei rated it really liked it Shelves: wwii.
It is always a very rewarding experience for any history enthusiastic to get a glimpse at the event through first hand account. In this case, the memoir of V. Manstein gives a very interesting combination of first-hand appreciation of the developing event and front line experience at least in the early years when he still commands a corps. In addition to the descriptions of the event with an emphasize that might be different from typical history book, the author also add in many insight and co It is always a very rewarding experience for any history enthusiastic to get a glimpse at the event through first hand account.
In addition to the descriptions of the event with an emphasize that might be different from typical history book, the author also add in many insight and comment about the challenges and opportunities of the situation he was facing and how and why they were developed as such. But perhaps the most valuable part is the plans he had proposed and what could have been done instead of what Hitler had insisted.
This would be of particular intellectual interests for those who have some knowledge about the background and how these event turned out historically. But this one could get used after a while. A more annoying feature to me is the tendency to repeat the same argument or descriptions of the same situation over and over again, especially in dealing with his disagreement with Hitler. Overall, if one overlooks the occasional repetitiveness, and somewhat clunky writing, this is a must read for whoever interested in the WWII history. Jan 05, Sicofonia rated it really liked it. Lost Victories is the Erich von Manstein's recollection of the operations and events he took part during WW2.
It is not an autobiography strictly speaking, as there's very little said about his childhood or his military career during WWI. There's an appendix at the end of the book with a brief biography, but it is very scarce. However, v. Manstein succeeds in giving the reader a clear and accurate insight of every grand operation he was involved in.
In that sense, the book has an exception histori Lost Victories is the Erich von Manstein's recollection of the operations and events he took part during WW2. In that sense, the book has an exception historical value. Perhaps it is too accurate for readers not familiar with the different campaigns that are described here. As I felt it was heavy to read sometimes, lacking the proper knowledge of the geography and environment, I had to piggyback on a map to create a picture of the events in my mind.
Timpino , Nov 17, Blog Entries: 0 Joined: Apr 26, Messages: 2. Hear hear! Evans , Nov 17, Blog Entries: 0 Joined: Sep 22, Messages: His actions against Sevastopol should definitely give him 'Fortress Buster' trait. Bedides Eben Emael sp? Don't know if he should be Field Marshall from the start of the game. Only few germs were promoted to Field Marshal, and not untill later in the war Rommel, after a bit of fighting in N-Africa, Von Paulus after a long siege in Stalingrad. Having read his book 'Lost Victories', he is defintely one of the better German leaders.
He is the grand architect behind Germany's Panzer formations, and without his initiatives and dedication to armoured warfare, the Blitz-war would have been impossible.
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Guderian: Achtung! Guderian: Panzer Leader, account of his experiences in fighting a campaign on the Eastern Front and his relations within the German High Command. Kyril , Nov 18, Blog Entries: 0 Joined: May 9, Messages: Well you can always edit it yourself to give him the fortress buster trait. Blog Entries: 0 Joined: Jan 17, Messages: I agree Manstein should have the fortress buster trait. Most of the German Generals interviewed after the war considered Manstein to be the best German general of the war. I quote from an excellent book by B. This was the verdict of most of those with whom I discussed the war, from Rundstedt downwards.
He had a superb strategic sense, combined with a greater understanding of mechanized weapons than any of the generals who did not belong to the tank school itself. Yet in contrast to some of the single-track enthusiasts he did not lose sight of the importance of improving alternative weapons, and defense. He was responsible, shortly before the war, for developing the armoured assault-gun, which proved invaluable later" p. Panzer Leader Transferred south he broke through the Crimea bottleneck and later took Sevestapol.
Fortress Buster. He stabilized the German line in the south after Stalingrad defensive doctrine. He led the last strategic German victory at Kharkov in early offensive doctrine, panzer leader. He proposed not striking at Kursk but waiting for the Russians to assault first and then striking - the famous Manstein Backhand Blow plan defensive doctrine.
Liddel Hart also notes "At conferences Manstein often differed from Hitler in front of others, and would go so far as to declare that some of the ideas Hitler put forward were nonsense.