Instead, the Concept or Idea is not finite in the sense of being limited in advance by any alterity or transcendence that is, a Kantian Ding an sich forever insur- mountably refractory by its essential nature to the incursions of categori- ally determined, conceptually mediated knowing. Without doing so, these historically youthful col- lective systems are at risk of destroying themselves sooner or later.
The defensibility of this is further reinforced substantially by the fact that Hegel, also in the preface to the Philosophy of Right, explicitly stipulates that the ability of philosophy to sublate the material of its times in thoughts signals the entering into decay and dissolution of the realities thus sublated; the sun must be setting when the wise owl takes flight.
Once the realm of representation [Vorstel- lung] is revolutionized, actuality [Wirklichkeit] will not hold out. As the preface to Elements of the Philosophy of Right also shows, Hegel is certainly against unphilosophically and vainly microman- aging ahead of time the empirical details of sociohistorical arrangements. Especially in regard to the latter, Hegel clearly sees himself as one step ahead but one step only of his Zeitgeist.
For him, the immediate, impending sociohistorical future is at least minimally a Schranke rather than a Grenze. Again, he neither fore- casts far off into later, yet-to-arrive stages of social history nor fabricates fleshed-out visions of the nitty-gritty concreteness of die sittliche Zukunft.
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Although whether a phoenix will rise and, if so, what kind of bird this will be—this phoenix of the future would be the close avian relative of the Owl of Minerva—are issues about which Hegel is deliberately silent, he definitely anticipates, subtly but firmly, that at the very least there soon will be ashes. Given that this incli- nation is logical that is, transhistorical , this entails the expectation of such recurrent alterations being perpetual off into the future although the determination of the exact cadences of such recurrences is left open.
It is because of this redoubled gap that every new form arises as a creation ex nihilo: the Noth- ingness out of which the New arises is the very gap between the Old-in-itself and the Old-for-the-New, the gap which makes impossible any account of the rise of the New in terms of a continuous narrative. What is involved in a dialectical analysis of, say, a past event, such as a revolutionary break? Does it really amount to identifying the underlying necessity that gov- erned the course of events in all their apparent confusion? What if the opposite is true, and dialectical analysis reinserts possibility into the necessity of the past?
No deduction will bring us from chaos to order; and to locate this moment of the magical turn, this unpredictable reversal of chaos into Order, is the true aim of dialectical analysis. But, the case can be made that, for Hegel, nothing guarantees in advance that progress will occur. Any progress is an after the fact effect to be discerned only retroactively and whose temporally antecedent causes are contingencies ; any necessity, as the preface to the Philosophy of Right spells out with pointed frankness, can be seen solely by the Owl of Minerva.
Stated with greater precision, in the Phenomenol- ogy, a dialectically self-generated deadlock or impasse afflicting a shape of consciousness does not contain within itself the promise of the fated actual arrival of a progressive step Beyond qua a resolution or exit. The dialectical self-subversions of consciousness, through their immanent determi- nate negations of themselves, just sketch the rough contours of what a possible solution to the problems they create for themselves would have to look like if such a solution arrives unpredictably one fine day. In other words, the thus-generated foreshadowings of subsequent progress, in the guise of approximate criteria for what would count as moving forward past specific cul-de-sacs, do not have the authoritative power to assure, as a matter of a simplistic teleology, the popping up in factual reality of realized escapes from these quagmires.
No metanecessity, such as the sufficient reason s of a Leibnizian God, supplements the necessity of natural laws with the purpo- sive final cause s of a teleology. The rabble embodies a problem that can become a determinate negation rather than simple negation as destruction of the present only if a future arrives in which this symptom and its underlying causes are more adequately addressed. Hence, with Hegel, deadlocks of a current actuality already fore- shadow and outline the parameters of what an immediately succeeding future actuality would have to be were it conditionally, contingently to count as a genuine step beyond the blockages and limits of the hic et nunc.
Admittedly, Hegel deliberately avoids preaching prophecies about necessary developments to come or concrete occurrences in the distant future. However near-sighted and uncertain of itself, this Hegelian weak predictive power is predictive power all the same. Today looks just as bad, if not worse: skyrocketing wealth inequality not seen since before World War I; endless amounts of tax cuts and corporate welfare for the ultrarich; equally endless amounts of disempowerment and dispossession for both the employed and the unemployed masses alike; postmodern returns of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century-style big power imperialist rivalries and resultant violent conflicts; and, the fetid, toxic tide of far-right populisms, nationalisms, fundamentalisms, and racisms sloshing around the entire globe Donald Trump, Brexit, Vladimir Putin, Marine Le Pen, and on and on.
On the one hand, a viciously reactionary state of affairs looks to be in the process of unwittingly driving itself to internally generated destruction partly by virtue of phenomena common to the nineteenth and late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries such as excessively grotesque and obscene wealth inequalities as well as the building tensions of great- power rivalries. On the other hand, nobody appears to be capable of artic- ulating an actually possible and potentially feasible alternative order as a successor Sittlichkeit to the currently imploding socioeconomic reality.
In short, a Hegelian leftist today neither can imagine the status quo continu- ing on into the future nor can imagine it not continuing. But be prepared for the likelihood of a long, brutal hangover the morning after these enthusiastic Bacchanalian festivities and, as Mao Tse-Tung would say, the probability but not certainty of near-to-medium-term defeat. As is to be expected, he pursues this via his characteristic blend of German idealism and psycho- analysis, employing especially Hegel and Lacan in order to creatively update dialectical materialism.
This reinforce- ment is brought about through him recovering and remobilizing the kind of carefully qualified naturalism essential to both Hegel and the post- Hegelian tradition of Marxist dialectical materialism. This treatise from appears not to put forward, in its frontal assaults upon its opponents, a genuinely dialectical materialist alternative to the worldviews it hotly contests. However, the relations between Materialism and Empirio-Criticism and properly dialectical materialism are much more compli- cated than the preceding brief remarks indicate.
I have addressed these com- plexities in detail elsewhere. But it just so happens to be a historical fact one meticulously and soberly documented by Loren R. Graham especially that many philosophers and scientists in the Soviet Union, pushing off from a dialectical material- ism fundamentally informed by a combination of Materialism and Empirio- Criticism and the Philosophical Notebooks, seriously practiced and interpreted the sciences of quantum mechanics, relativity theory, and cosmology and cosmogony not to mention chemistry and the life sciences over and above physics.
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That is to say, while contemporary Marxists have mightily resisted the crude anti- Marxist gesture of indefensibly equating Marxist politics tout court with the figure of Joseph Stalin, they appear, for the most part, to have fought less fiercely if at all against equally crude reductions of Marxist theory qua the Engelsian-Leninist dialectics of nature, with its unique Soviet leg- acy, to the lone figure of Trofim Denisovich Lysenko.
And this enemy has not ceased to be victorious. Lenin is not only criticized via Marx; Marx is criticized in turn via Hegel. Second, despite being materialism without matter, it is not idealism without an idea—it is a materialism with an Idea, an assertion of the eternal Idea outside the space of idealism. Instead, nature in this case is envisioned as shot through and permeated with the immanent negativities of antagonisms, conflicts, discrepancies, and ten- sions. Moreover, such a realism by no means entails necessarily either dialectics or anything material in a way distin- guishable from the ideational.
They constitute a theoreti- cal core both supporting neither an idealism of metaphysically real forms nor a panpsychism of the split psyche and able to be held up as a legitimate extension of the Marxian-Engelsian dialectical materialist tradition as well as an inheritor of the enduringly valid aspects of the Hegelian Philosophy of Nature. Specifically, biology is simultaneously 1 a natural science and region of nature emergent from but irreducible to physics and chemistry as well as 2 the threshold realm out of which arise sentient and sapient subjects.
Put differently, the barred Real is nec- essary but not sufficient for the barred subject. Less Than Nothing, with reference to this pivotal but enig- matic moment in the Hegelian encyclopedic System, exegetically empha- sizes the textual fact that the logical Idea, upon completing itself, suddenly allows Nature to come into actual being as an independent, extralogical exis- tence unto itself.
The humans seeming to shatter the fantasized organic consistency of nature are them- selves the products of nature. Hence, nature itself is self-shattering. How does its emergence affect nature? The first explanatory line receives additional elaboration in Absolute Recoil. He proposes: Should we not take a step further beyond the ontological break between language and the living body and ask: how must the real be structured so that that break can emerge within it? In other words, language colonizing the living body from without cannot be the last word since, in some sense, language itself has to be part of the real.
How to think this belonging outside the naturalization of lan- guage? There is only one consistent answer: by de-naturalizing nature itself. About this Schelling, one could say that the rabbit he pulls out of his hat is the one he put there beforehand. Likewise, he also repeatedly confronts the equally daunting and persistent divide between freedom and determinism from various angles.
Hence, I will try to avoid in what follows excessively or needlessly recapitulating these earlier discussions.
This is why such acts are difficult to imagine, and why, when they do occur, one tends to invent a narrative which normalizes them. A basic stance held in common between Kant and Lacan is their shared insistence that the domain of this type of personal identity is not all there is to subjec- tivity. One even could say that, for these two thinkers, the subject proper is something different in kind from such selfhood.
So what is wrong with the rule of the pleasure principle? For Lacan, exactly the same description holds for desire, which is why enjoyment is not something that comes naturally to the subject, as a realization of his or her inner potential, but is the content of a traumatic superegoic injunction. He recurrently insists that this synthesis of freedom as in idealism and Todestrieb as in analysis is the core concern of his entire oeuvre. While the pure past is the transcen- dental condition for our acts, our acts not only create new actual reality, they also retroactively change this very condition.
Their idealistic subject qua set of possibility conditions for empirical, experiential structures and phenomena itself remains beyond, behind, or beneath everything situated in time. He also assumes a more Hegelian than Fichtean dialectical-speculative, reciprocal interpenetration of self qua form that is, acting subject and non- self qua content that is, objects as what are acted upon as well as performed acts themselves.
This whole circuit in its entirety amounts to a tempo- rally elongated dynamic of self-reflexivity stretching out over past, present, and future. The two giants of transcendental idealism representing the first main phase of German idealism, the one preceding the rise of objective and absolute ideal- isms with Schelling and Hegel succeed at disclosing an incomplete, disunited phenomenal field of dialectically unstable organizations and operations, including a more-than-phenomenal subjectivity nonetheless inextricably intertwined with this same field.
But Kant and Fichte, each in his own man- ner, shrink back from the ultimate ontological consequences potentially to be unfurled out of their philosophical efforts. Arguably, Kant and Fichte unlike Schelling and Hegel both flirt with, if not outright embrace, such incompatibilism, at least sometimes and to certain degrees.
I am determined by causes, but I can retroactively deter- mine which causes will determine me: we, subjects, are passively affected by pathological objects and motivations; but, in a reflexive way, we have the minimal power to accept or reject being affected in this way, that is, we retroactively determine the causes allowed to determine us, or, at least, the mode of this linear determination. And vice versa: the space of our freedom itself is sustained by the situation in which we find ourselves.
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This requisite labor will occupy me for some while in what follows. I will identify in chronological order the different constit- uents involved in this complex contextual framing of his remarks. Kant is the first major presence, casting a long shadow over these considerations. Through the pres- ent moment of such an autonomous decision, the subject chooses which past influences bearing upon this hic et nunc will become, in the immediate future, what will have been the decisive, sufficient motivators of its conse- quent eventual deed.
That is to say, a potential cause becomes an actual cause only after-the- f act of generating an ensuing actual effect. Again, I will return to these issues soon. As with the Libet material, I will circumnavigate back to this critical query shortly. Succinctly stated, for Lacan, whether or not a given action as a piece of comportment, a deed, or a doing will have been an act as a true disruption of established Imagi- nary-Symbolic reality 57 gets determined after-the- f act.
But such echoes, while not entirely misleading Badiou too sketches a dynamic of ret- roactive positing of presuppositions in his portrayal of subjects of events ,63 arguably distort as much as they disclose. Succinctly stated, with no free present, there is no insufficient or incomplete past; with no insufficient or incomplete past, there is no free present. Bluntly stated, contingency as mere indetermination is far from being freedom as full-blown self-determina- tion. This certainly is the view of the vast majority of Western philosophers past and present, holding with special strength for Kant and his German ide- alist successors.
For example, there is no direct link or even a sign of equation between human freedom and quantum indeterminacy: sim- ple intuition tells us that if an occurrence depends on pure chance, if there is no causality in which to ground it, this in no way makes it an act of freedom. Freedom is not the absence of causality, it occurs not when there is no causal- ity, but when my free will is the cause of an event or decision—when some- thing happens not without cause, but because I wanted it to happen. Less Than Nothing spends ample time philosophically scrutinizing and absorbing material from the natural sciences with the utmost seriousness and care.
Rather, it thoroughly sub- lates als Aufhebung the traditional, Verstand-style dichotomy between nonhuman nature and nonnatural culture by transforming both sides of this distinction simultaneously and in tandem with each other. Recourse to Schelling might exacerbate the temptation to dubiously short- circuit the level distinction between, on the one hand, natural quantum objects and processes as neither sentient nor sapient and, on the other hand, significantly larger spiritual als Hegelian Geist constellations and oper- ations as bound up with uniquely human sentience and sapience.
It can be argued that they demonstrate how there is no free will: even before we consciously decide say, to move a finger , the appropriate neuronal processes are already underway, which means that our conscious decision just takes note of what is already going on adding its super- fluous authorization to a fait accompli. On the other hand, consciousness does seem to have the veto power to stop this process already underway, so there seems to be at least the freedom to block our spontaneous decisions. There is, however, a third, more radical option. Prior to Freud, Schelling developed the notion that the basic free decisions made by us are uncon- scious.
And, what is the ontological status of this unconscious, if there indeed is one? Is it not that of a purely virtual sym- bolic order, of a pure logical presupposition the decision had to be made, although it was never effectively made in real time? That is to say, does it not re apply the behaviorist reduction a reduction to observable positive processes to internal processes: mind is no longer a black box, but a computational machine? But, without additional supporting argumentation, what prevents the opening up of an intermina- ble, irresolvable tit-for-tat regress? In this sense, what we perceive as the most immediate sensual reality is already the result of complex elaboration and judgment, a hypothesis which results from the combination of sensual signals and the matrix of expectations.
More precisely, the first Critique powerfully presents the case that what is experi- enced by human beings as their reality is not some brute, raw, primitive givenness, namely, direct disclosures of mind-independent objective things and occurrences manifest and registered as presumably simple, immediate sensory-perceptual data. That is to say, on an analytic account, consciousness functions more to block out than to let in sensory-perceptual impressions. We would be totally suf- focated by billions of data with, in a way, no empty breathing space around us, directly part of the world.
Without these filters, the human mind would be paralyzed into inactivity through being thoroughly overwhelmed by an indigestible poverty of riches such that nei- ther in its cognitions nor comportments would it be able to act as a free agent. To start at the broadest of philosophical levels, Libet espouses what fairly could be described as an emergent dual-aspect monism.
For Libet, more-than-material mind emerges from material brain, with the former thereafter becoming irreducible to the latter. If so, this would suggest that conscious mindedness possesses a functional unity independent at least in certain respects of its material basis in the anatomy and physiology of the central nervous system. Libet echoes this post-Freudian consensus with his repeated assertions that a sizable amount of neuronal and mental processes integral to cognitive, emotional, and motivational functioning remains implicit qua nonconscious.
The Freudian unconscious proper is not merely the absence of consciousness. However, Libet goes further here in two ways. First, he suggests that, in the roughly five-hundred-millisecond interval between an initiated neural firing sequence and a belated awareness of this sequence as an intention to act, unconscious defense mechanisms might be able to take advantage of this interval so as to distort, inflect, modify, or nudge how late-to-arrive consciousness takes note of and responds to the underlying intention in question.
Second, he maintains that the time lag his investigations reveal shows that any region of the brain capable of affecting consciousness can also work unconsciously because every such region works in and through the temporal gaps of delays. These matrices of mate- rial and more-than-material shared configurations structure individuals who become and remain proper subjects through how these individuals internalize and instantiate such configurations. These realities exist only in and through their specific instantiations at the level of particular individuals.
What are called for are interlinked, coordinated phylogenetic and onto- genetic renditions of the emergence of the cultural out of the natural. At the ontogenetic level, fundamental questions of the following kind would have to be asked and answered How is the anatomy and physiology of the human animal receptive to being permeated and modulated by external milieus, especially of a sociolinguistic sort?
Why are these overriding or, as Lacan would prefer, overwriting impositions from without not rejected like failed organ transplants by the libidinally charged bodies onto which they are impressed, but supported and perpetuated by these very bodies? How and why is the latter free in and through the former? What is involved in the genesis of human history out of natural history?
Assuming human history in fact does so, how does it achieve at least partially a separateness from natural history? How and why does nature enable and participate in this, namely, a break with it permitted and catalyzed from nowhere other than within itself? What exactly would a Naturphilosophie with an ontology of self-sundering, autode- naturalizing nature look like that is both uncompromisingly materialist and quasi- naturalist qua responsible with respect to the empirical, exper- imental sciences of nature?
And how are these phylogenetic topics to be sys- tematically combined with the ontogenetic ones outlined earlier? Why does dialectical mediation always continue its work? But why should there not be at the base of dialectics a tension between dialectics and its non-dialecticizable core? With regard to the precise status of negativity, the situation is thus in a way reversed: it is Hegel who offers a series of Vers, of displaced variations of negativity, and it is only in psychoanalysis, through Freud and Lacan, that we can formulate the elementary form of negativity. This motor is a recurrent circling movement exhibiting an aceph- alous, idiotic character resembling a mechanical automaton rather than a human subject.
There, the first and most substantial articulation of this difference, an initial articulation upon which subsequent returns to this topic in both Less Than Nothing and Absolute Recoil draw, begins thus: What does drive mean from a philosophical standpoint?
With regard to satisfaction, this does not mean that, in contrast to desire which is constitutively non-satisfied, the drive achieves sat- isfaction by way of reaching the object which eludes desire. Even worse, if such perfection were to be attained, it would immediately cancel itself out, ceasing to be moral by virtue of nullifying itself in closing the gap between the will and the inclinations. If the will can be good only in and through its resistance to the inclinations, then eliminating the ten- sion between these two is tantamount to eliminating morality tout court.
Even with such substantial historical and philosophical supplementation, it would still be highly debatable. There is thus a double distinction to be drawn here: not only between the objet a in its fantasmatic and post-fantas- matic status, but also, within this post-fantasmatic domain itself, between the lost object-cause of desire and the object-loss of the drive. This substantiality therefore is, in proper Hegelian fashion, self-sundering and autodialecticiz- ing.
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This rotary movement, in which the linear progress of time is suspended in a repetitive loop, is the drive at its most elementary. In regard to Freud, one could take as an example here the Freudian oral drive. The hunger of an instinct als Instinkt to obtain nourishment would, in the case of a human infant, invest in milk as the nourishing substance an sich.
There, he contrasts human and nonhuman primate responses to reflective surfaces. The nonhuman primate quickly realizes that the mirror image is nothing but a semblance, the flat, superficial illu- sion of a conspecific who is not really there, and then quite reasonably loses interest in it as unreal. Instead, this System allegedly can accommodate them, but in ways other than those that Hegel himself might favor. Fidelity requires a certain amount of betrayal.
The last sentence of the preceding block quotation is somewhat enigmatic. It triangulates desire, drive, and instinct in a not-entirely-transparent fash- ion. However, even with these specifications, there is much that still remains mysterious and opaque at this point. The drive does not express itself, it stumbles upon an exter- nal element or obstacle; it does not pass from one to another of its manifes- tations or expressions, it gets stuck on one of them.
It is not driven back to itself through overcoming or annihilating its expressions, but through not being able to do so. But we should take a step further here and read Freud more radically: the drive is natural, but the natural thrown out of joint, distorted or deformed by cul- ture; it is culture in its natural state. This is why the drive is a kind of imaginary focus, or meeting place, between psychoanalysis and cognitive brain sciences: the paradox of the self-propelling loop on which the entire Freudian edifice is based and which the brain sciences approach in metaphoric formulations, with- out being able to define it precisely.
This extended detour is not only centered upon the theoretical content of Beyond the Plea- sure Principle; however wisely and justifiably or not, I also, in the spirit of this same Freudian text from , take the liberty in what follows of indulg- ing in a number of lines of metapsychological speculation, of highly ten- tative conjecturing and hypothesizing. What ensues should be taken in this manner.
That is to say, instincts too, insofar as they are conceived of as evolutionarily and genetically preprogrammed behavioral repertoires oriented toward specific sorts of stimuli and entities, compel repetition, dictating perpetually recurring actions of certain types. With reference to the Freudian death drive initially surfacing in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, what really perplexes Freud and prompts him to cre- ate the notion of the Todestrieb is not repetition compulsion in and of itself, on its own.
Rather, it is the compulsive repeating of failed efforts to re install the intrapsychical hegemony of the pleasure principle. Insofar as this principle orders the simultaneous pursuit of pleasure and corresponding avoidance of unpleasure, it is hardly unique to the sentient and sapient mindedness distinctive of humans. Is there a form of feeling life that does not follow a fundamental tendency along the lines of such a principle? In this vein, there is nothing accidental, careless, or haphazard about the later Freud, with his recasting of the pleasure principle in tandem with the new duality of Eros and the Todestrieb, permitting himself indulgence in speculations roaming far and wide across the expanses of the animate and even inanimate world.
As a mental leg- islator, it possesses relatively limited powers. And it has no more powerful Other standing behind it as a secret, profound metalaw steering things when its feeble regime is in default and disarray. This challenges the intuitive notion of it as being an almighty monis- tic nexus of seamlessly connected elements controlled by inviolable laws of effi- cient causality.
In such a vision of the material universe, human nature can be imagined only as an overdetermined subcomponent of a macrocosmic web of entities exhaustively integrated through causal relations. It is generated, at least in part, by two questionable presuppositions. Sec- ond, both nature generally and human nature specifically are consistently lawful, with their organizations and functions always obeying if not one law that of Eros , then another that of the Todestrieb. The Freud of Beyond the Pleasure Principle and related texts is brought into the proximity of garden-variety scientistic nat- uralism not only in and through his references to things biological; he shares with this Weltanschauung a rationalistic belief in, so to speak, the established, effective rule of law, namely, in an always-principled ordering of the entities and events, structures and dynamics of concern to him.
As I claimed ear- lier, neither Wiederholungszwang nor the Lustprinzip by themselves embodies a clear-cut, hard-and-fast divide between human drives and animal instincts. Instinctive animals, like driven humans, compulsively repeat behavioral strategies and tactics for seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. Of course, Freud early on grasps and illuminates the peculiarities of dis- tinctively human libidinal economies. As is common knowledge, the ground- breaking first edition of his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality lays the foundations, in , of the distinction between Instinkt and Trieb.
When this deservedly celebrated fundamental dimension of Freudian psychoanalysis is taken into consideration, one can say, with respect to the differences between human and nonhuman organisms entwined with the distinction between drive and instinct, that humans exhibit singular idiosyn- crasies so different in degree from other animals as to be tantamount to a difference in kind. In other words, the drives of human animals distinguish themselves in displaying far less transindividual regularity and uniformity than, by glaring contrast, the instincts of nonhuman animals dictating spe- cies-typic patterns of comportment across individuals.
This is one of several truly rather than speciously distinguishing features between drive and instinct. One of the catalysts for the crystallization of the death drive in is this puzzle- ment in the face of failure to be precise, the failure of a Lustprinzip, which was maintained, before , to be the final, inviolable law of laws of mental life, always triumphant in enforcing its ultimate, inescapable rule.
According to this implicit measure, when a given form of acting proves to be maladaptive in the sense of not con- ducive or even in the sense of detrimental to the happiness and well-being of the acting creature, the creature in question, if functional qua adaptive, will presumably adjust its comportment accordingly, adopting new actions to replace the old, unsuccessful ones.
This assumption is enshrined in the Freudian corpus before in the guise of nothing other than the Lustprinzip itself. And this principle from before , independent of any additional caveats, nuances, or supplements, does not, on its own, support bold con- trasts and differentiations between human and animal, drive and instinct, or related distinctions along these same lines.
Driven humans and instinc- tual animals alike could be said to strive to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. In and of itself, the pleasure principle alone, as an ideal model in the bare isolation of being an unqualified metapsychological conceptual con- struct, is an aspect of life in general shared among all sentient beings qua sentient that is, able to feel, with every feeling being [able to be] situated on a spectrum between the pleasurable and the painful.
First and foremost, there are the self-sabotaging dynamics of countless suffer- ers of various neuroses, with their talents for invariably snatching defeat from the jaws of victory, for pissing off themselves and others, for transub- stantiating gifts of gold into shit, for recurrently fucking over themselves and their dissatisfied and dissatisfying partners, and so on.
Well before Jenseits des Lustprinzips, Freud is all too familiar with such neurotic misfir- ings and breakdowns of the pleasure principle from clinical and personal experience. In both of these instances, the psyche spontaneously and gratuitously inflicts discomfort or even anguish on itself. In recent times, this DSM term has sadly gone from the realms of the technical to popular discourse for a number of lamentable socioeco- nomic and political reasons. The hegemony before of the pleasure principle is epitomized by the central thesis of The Interpretation of Dreams, the landmark turn-of-the- century work founding psychoanalysis strictly speaking, that all dreams without exception obey the pleasure principle by representing, in however distorted and deceptive a guise, the fulfillment of wishes.
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Hence, even nightmares are not actual exceptions to or refutations of the pleasure principle, being interpretively reducible, through proper analysis, to repression-evading encryptions of gratifying wish fulfillments, to cen- sor-skirting encodings of the satisfactions of impulses that cannot con- sciously be avowed as such.
Thus, even this negation of wish fulfillment in a dream fulfills a wish namely, the wish that Freud be mistaken and fallible. In confronting such phenomena, the later Freud indeed comes to concede that the pleasure principle is intrapsychically neither omnipresent nor omnipotent. Nonetheless, Freud still tries to smooth over what would other- wise be the very rough edges of an abrupt break violently punctuating his intellectual itinerary in But, with this, what remains for Freud and everyone after him is what still should be a source of analytic wonder: the fact that the fruitlessness and futility of this Wiederholungszwang in its purported pleasure-preparatory function, a function whose aim these sorts of repetition compulsions thwart even while they attempt to carry it out, do not eventually lead, sooner or later, to an adaptive change in favor of different approaches.
As the second coming, the return to power, the restoration of the pleasure principle inter- minably keep not arriving, why is there obstinately continued observance of the well-worn rites and rituals themselves serving in actuality only to postpone and forestall indefinitely such redemption and salvation? I have read about all the words suggested by dict. Is there a German equivalent?
What is it? I have been wanting to use this word for comical effect exactly as in the television series "How I met your mother", so I am extra interested in the exact translation used in the dub of this series. There's also a concept of "intervention" in the area of medicine, mostly in cases of mental disorders e. This would resemble the " intervention counseling ". And I would expect a comical effect anyway, because there's an obvious lack of proportionality between the means and the end in the Youtube clip.
So I'm sure that the meaning of "intervention" can be deduced from the scenes themselves. The dubbed version uses the direct translation: "Intervention" not that I watch it in German, I used the powers of YouTube [dead link]. I'm not really sure if there is a concept in Germany that's similar to the interventions shown on that show. I never heard about it before I saw it there and I never heard of anything like that to this day.
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This is still somewhat formal, but no longer implying politic or diplomatic context as Intervention would do. Intervention is the common terminology of psychologists and street workers. Eingriff or Einschreiten would be a translation without loanword. More german - greetings to Poland ; - would just be Einmarsch.
The corners are sharp, pages are crisp and the spine is nice. Binding: Hardcover. Rare 1st edition of the author's last book. A slight separation at the inside of the front cover. Very nice copy. Not perfect, but very nice. Covers are very good with light shelf wear. Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, Written in German. This title was originally published in The book here for sale has on the title page. There is no reference to it being a later edition. Historische Entwickelung der heutigen Staatsverfassung desTeutschen Reichs.
Published in German language, very rare. Faults listed above, otherwise clean pages and good binding. Christian Wurstisen was a Photobook " The Way to Lhasa". Printed in Prague. China, Tibet. Good condition. Leiden [NE]: E. Brill, First Edition Thus repr. Classic handbook on Byzantine knowledge concerning the Turkic peoples from the Huns to the Ottoman Turks. It will be back and hold it's own.
No other markings. Hardcover, pages, a lot of Illustrations. One of the first edition of This book. Major A. Rare Edition! Good condition, minor blemishes of age, no writing or markings. Arterner Stadtjahr By L P Brockett. Also covers history of 'Paris under the Commune; or, the Red Rebellion of '. It was designed to describe cities and towns in These three parts are the final 3 parts of the complete series.
This book covers the following French towns and communes Language: German. Berliner Stadtlandschaften, Rolf Bothe. Interior sharp and clean throughout, vg. This copy is in excellent condition and totally intact. Published by Aubier, Paris Erlebt: Geschrieben: Excellent condition. German language fanzine. More than just a pretty picture.
Great period art nouveau binding.