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- 6 Eigentum, Arbeit, Geld: Zur Logik einer Naturrechtsökonomie bei John Locke (Kap. 5)
- Kant’s Social and Political Philosophy
- Das Eigentum bei John Locke (German Edition)
- A Social and Political Philosophy Bibliography
Home Research Research projects Research Normativity. A5 The State as Worldly Absolute The project aimed to analyse, both historically and with regard to current discussions, the thesis of modern practical philosophy that the state is an absolute reason for and subject of obligations which cannot be subordinated to religious contents and authorities. In: Giornale di Metafisica. Nuova Serie XXX, , no.
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6 Eigentum, Arbeit, Geld: Zur Logik einer Naturrechtsökonomie bei John Locke (Kap. 5)
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Kant’s Social and Political Philosophy
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Das Eigentum bei John Locke (German Edition)
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A Social and Political Philosophy Bibliography
It is not a fight against the established [ Stirner was writing about people liberating themselves from their own limits and rising above limiting social, political and ideological conditions and for each to walk their own way. The passages quoted above are clearly incompatible with David Leopold's conclusion in his introduction to the Cambridge University Press edition that Stirner "saw humankind as 'fretted in dark superstition' but denied that he sought their enlightenment and welfare" Ibidem , p. Stirner refused to describe himself as directly liberating others, but his stated purpose in these quotations seems to be to achieve the "enlightenment and welfare" of others by way of demonstration and " insurrection " as he defines it.
The passages quoted above show the few points of contact between Stirner's philosophy and early Christianity. It is merely Jesus as an "annihilator" of the established biases and preconceptions of Rome that Stirner can relate to. His reason for "citing" the cultural change sparked by Jesus is that he wants the Christian ideologies of 19th century Europe to collapse, much as the ideology of heathen Rome did before it e. As with the classical skeptics before him, Stirner's method of self-liberation is opposed to faith or belief and he envisions a life free from "dogmatic presuppositions" p.
It is not merely Christian dogma that his thought repudiates, but also a wide variety of European atheist ideologies that are condemned as crypto-Christian for putting ideas in an equivalent role:. Among many transformations, the Holy Spirit became in time the 'absolute idea' [in Hegelian philosophy], which again in manifold refractions split into the different ideas of philanthropy, reasonableness, civic virtue, and so on.
This is the religious world [of our time], to which Hegel gave a systematic expression, bringing method into the nonsense and completing the conceptual precepts into a rounded, firmly-based dogmatic. Everything is sung according to concepts and the real man, I, am compelled to live according to these conceptual laws.
The thinker is distinguished from the believer only by believing much more than the latter, who, on his part, thinks of much less as signified by his faith creed. The thinker has a thousand tenets of faith where the believer gets along with few; but the former brings coherence into his tenets, and take the coherence in turn for the scale to estimate their worth by. What Stirner proposes is not that concepts should rule people, but that people should rule concepts. The "nothingness" of all truth is rooted in the "nothingness" of the self because the ego is the criterion of dogmatic truth.
Again, Stirner seems closely comparable to the skeptics in that his radical epistemology directs us to emphasise empirical experience the "unmediated" relationship of mind as world and world as mind , but it leaves only a very limited validity to the category of "truth".
When we regard the impressions of the senses with detachment, simply for what they are e. Christianity took away from the things of this world only their irresistibleness [ In like manner I raise myself above truths and their power: as I am above the sensual, so I am above the truth. Before me truths are as common and as indifferent as things; they do not carry me away, and do not inspire me with enthusiasm. There exists not even one truth, not right, not freedom, humanity, etc.
As the riches of this world do not make me happy, so neither do its truths. Truths are material, like vegetables and weeds; as to whether vegetable or weed, the decision lies in me. In place of such systems of beliefs, Stirner presents a detached life of non-dogmatic, open-minded engagement with the world "as it is" unpolluted by "faith" of any kind, Christian or humanist , coupled with the awareness that there is no soul, no personal essence of any kind, but that the individual's uniqueness consists solely in its "creative nothingness" prior to all concepts.
While the latter has an "un-Hegelian structure and tone" on the whole and is hostile to Hegel's conclusions about the self and the world, Stepelevich argues that Stirner's work is best understood as answering Hegel's question of the role of consciousness after it has contemplated "untrue knowledge" and become "absolute knowledge".
Stirner, Stepelevich concludes, presents the consequences of the rediscovering one's self-consciousness after realizing self-determination. However, Widukind De Ridder has argued that scholars who take Stirner's references to Hegel and the Young Hegelians as expressions of his own alleged Hegelianism are highly mistaken. De Ridder argues that The Ego and Its Own is in part a carefully constructed parody of Hegelianism, deliberately exposing its outwornness as a system of thought; and that Stirner's notions of "ownness" and "egoism" were part of his radical criticism of the implicit teleology of Hegelian dialectics.
Stirner was a philosopher whose "name appears with familiar regularity in historically-orientated surveys of anarchist thought as one of the earliest and best-known exponents of individualist anarchism". At first sight, Nazi totalitarianism may seem the opposite of Stirner's radical individualism. But fascism was above all an attempt to dissolve the social ties created by history and replace them by artificial bonds among individuals who were expected to render explicit obedience to the state on grounds of absolute egoism.
Fascist education combined the tenets of asocial egoism and unquestioning conformism, the latter being the means by which the individual secured his own niche in the system. Stirner's philosophy has nothing to say against conformism, it only objects to the Ego being subordinated to any higher principle: the egoist is free to adjust to the world if it is clear he will better himself by doing so. His 'rebellion' may take the form of utter servility if it will further his interest; what he must not do is to be bound by 'general' values or myths of humanity.
The totalitarian ideal of a barrack-like society from which all real, historical ties have been eliminated is perfectly consistent with Stirner's principles: the egoist, by his very nature, must be prepared to fight under any flag that suits his convenience. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Part of a series on Individualism Topics and concepts. Principal concerns. Main articles: Egoist anarchism and Individualist anarchism in Europe. Main article: Union of egoists. In: Frederick J.
Adelmann ed. Boston: Boston College Chestnut Hill For a summary and a fresh view, see Bernd A. The Ego and Its Own. The New Hegelians.