- Trumpism: a disfigured Americanism
- Trumpism: a disfigured Americanism | Palgrave Communications
In families, for example, bonds of affection typically arise from a nurturing relationship which, at least in the early years, is defined by a high degree of dependency. From these bonds of affection reciprocal trust and commitment typically develops. This outrage either arises from 1 a lack of demonstrable evidence for, or 2 in reaction to a violation of, those qualities one comes to reasonably expect from family members.
Harm and neglect, however they are qualified or defined, constitute defensible reasons for moral outrage, and suggest that the bonds of affection for which families ought to be commended, have in some significant sense been compromised or disregarded. Family members, then, respond to one another not only from a way of belonging but also from a sense of mutual responsibility. Particularly during calamitous times and moments of profound interpersonal crisis, the very substance of family bonds is oftentimes tested in ways previously unimagined.
When exterior forces threaten to disrupt family cohesion, its members predictably cling to one another by whatever threads bind them together. In much the same way, compatriots, buffeted by real or imagined attack, bind together not from a relational bond but from a circumscribed identity that importantly identifies one as a Swede, a Ugandan or a New Zealander. Indeed, patriots are loyal to their homeland and fellow citizens in much the same way that grown children in most cases are, or ought to be, loyal to their parents. It is in this way that a patriot identifies with her country, precisely because it is her country.
The obligations we have to one another, as family mem- bers or compatriots, correspond closely to the loyalties we typically feel, and these involve vested interests and actions that derive their efficacy from bonds of kinship. Consequently, the various ways in which group co-members of families, voluntary associations, religious communions or nationalities are inclined to help each other is altogether unexceptional. Indeed, it is hard to imagine loyalties and responsibilities without partiality.
Impartiality is of course commendable in some circumstances, particularly when favoritism will lead to decidedly harmful consequences. Conflict mediators and jury members need to show impartiality in order to reach a peaceful resolution for both parties or so that justice may be served.
Moreover, patriotic partiality that sanctions a distorted historical record, one that, say, whitewashes the direct role of the federal government in displacing and slaughtering tens of thousands of American Indians or which downplays the state sanctioned discrimination against women and individuals or groups of color, is a completely indefensible form of partiality. Of course the analogies of family loyalties to patriotic ones are imprecise. Yet, justifiably or not, individuals who withdraw from family obligations and respons- ibilities, say, to care for an ailing parent, are usually viewed with scorn.
This is because they are seen as having special obligations to their family members not only by virtue of their blood relation but also owing to the putative quality of the relationship. Merry Herman, However, notwithstanding the goods to come of our familial and social bonds, including those we share with compatriots, we still have reason to be concerned with the means by which said bonds develop.
To the extent that coercion can be detected in fostering bonds of affection and corresponding loyalties there are strong grounds for impugning their legitimacy. In other words, we will have reason to question their being freely offered and reciprocated. Democracy, Social Stability and Coercion The education of children is not merely the business of the parents or the local community; indeed, the broader society has an interest in the education of its citizenry. Given the condition of pluralism, the need for public education stems from the important interests of society and its members concerning the social stability, economic prosperity and democratic function of learning.
Why demo- cratic? Education needs to be democratic so that pupils come to learn in an environment that gives considerable weight not only to their willing participation but their own intellectual contributions as well Merry, a. Likewise, some measure of social stability is a reasonable political good.
The freedom to dissent may regress into anarchy and anomie if not balanced by a core of central ideals or beliefs shared by a critical mass of citizens. Indeed, many feel that the approach I am advocating for will reduce the evocative power of heroes that loyal patriotism tells us are worthy of emulation. The bonds of cohesion in our society are sufficiently fragile, or so it seems to me, that it makes no sense to strain them by encouraging and exalting cultural and linguistic apartheid. Schlesinger, , pp. Indeed, disallowing the State to promote its interests through schools will only weaken its stability if we understand stability to mean masses of people who uncritically embrace ideals via dubious instrumental means.
The means by which consent is garnered is extremely important, for in soliciting the willing participation of its members, there is legitimacy. Legitimacy is import- ant because outcomes without it are coerced; further, independent thinking and autonomy are unable to blossom in its absence. Education must, therefore, foster independent thinking and a capacity for rational evaluation that enables one to weigh different and potentially competing claims.
This deliberative process guides the civic aim of education, which is to seek out the public good Merry, a. These interests may, however, coincide. Rather, the public good must be expan- sive enough to consider the welfare of non-citizens, too. Avoidance of coercion is not always possible, nor is it always desirable.
For example, we willingly accept a fair amount of coercion where children are concerned pro- vided one has their best interests in mind. Coercion of children is in fact necessary in many cases in order to ensure their protection and safety but also because children are not fully autonomous, i. In short, children are rarely held fully accountable certainly not in the eyes of the law for the choices that they make see Merry, b. States also coerce citizens, specifically in order to compel obedience to laws through inducements or penalties of various kinds.
Examples include coercion to pay taxes, attend school, serve on juries, and wear seat belts. Yet, despite what libertarians may think, each of these can be justified by appealing to a certain conception of a well-functioning society that aims to serve the public good. Other forms of state coercion are subtler and favor some groups more than others e. Perhaps this is where the difficulty with loyal patriotism and the State truly lies. For with patriotism it is particularly worrying that an instrument of the State, viz. This is especially true, knowing that states also resort to secrecy and deception in order to further their political aims.
Secrecy has an inner dynamic of inevit- able growth. Thus, considering how unlikely it is that states will do any differently—for self-preservation lies at the heart of statecraft—it seems wholly unwise to cede authority to the State so that it might promote loyalty to itself via the patriotic aims and effects of public schools. This is so for at least two reasons. First, loyalty to the State is not one of the legitimate aims of education.
Devel- oping a capacity for reasoning, critical thinking and economic self-reliance is. A robust citizenship is not pusillanimous, and this means that the State will also value the capacity for and the exercise of dissent. Indeed, civil disobedience and consci- entious objection are both perfectly valid ways of expressing citizenship. This does not mean that it is the proper role of educators to encourage disagreement with the government as an end in itself.
But neither is it the proper role of educators to encourage assent to the aims of government via loyal—read uncritical, unreflective— patriotic practices. For the State to engage in the cultivation of assent to its own patriotic purposes, it places its own self-serving interests in conflict with those children have reason to value, viz.
Second, the deliberate aim of cultivating patriotism in school children lessens the possibility for freely offered consent Brighouse, Far more preferable than a coerced patriotism is an autonomous agent who is able to offer her consent when she has well-informed reasons to do so.
Trumpism: a disfigured Americanism
With these reasons one may come to embrace the sort of critical patriotism I have described in the foregoing pages, but one also may not. Merry schools, teachers will need to be particularly vigilant, encouraging critical reflection on the material students read. And while this places an additional burden on teachers, it seems necessary that multiple historical and media perspectives are needed to help facilitate desirable outcomes. In some ways this approach resembles the Kantian categorical imperative, viz.
Put another way, in whatever one does and however one thinks, edu- cators would do well to encourage their students to give ethical consideration to all people irrespective of their nationality. This is because each person possesses intrinsic value and is equally deserving of dignity and moral consideration, regard- less of where they were born, which language they speak, or which culture, social class or sexual preference they may have.
Indeed, this wider understanding of citizenship calls out for social justice that transcends political expediency and presidential prerogatives. A critical patriotism will not be inconsistent with such a studied approach. These critics argue that established communities provide us not only with the essential ingredients neces- sary for a personal identity but also the foundation for mutual trust and a willingness to abide by a set of agreed upon principles. Furthermore, our patriotic attachments are not sui generis, for our loyalties and affections for country derive first and foremost from affections closer to home, viz.
Walzer, , p. These provide the basis, the foundation, for allegiances that grow outward from them. In short, there is simply too much utopianism in a world citizenship and it seems more reasonable to assume that individuals will need something much closer to home with which to identify before constructing patriotic sentiment or reasoning.
It seems reasonable to say that persons will be more capable of respecting, appreciating and embracing different political traditions or cultural accomplishments after they have first acknowledged and embraced their own. No one is ever entirely extricated from cultural constraints, nor should they be. In no way is this necessarily at odds with championing freedom and justice for non-citizens and foreign nationals. But it does not follow that the critical patriot ought not to look outward from the specific tradition of which she is a part.
In short, world citizenship works by gradually sen- sitizing the student to the facts concerning human variety and showing why it is dangerous to assume that one is correct merely because a set of beliefs and values is familiar. Of course one may also turn to counter narratives from within the American mosaic; there are numerous counter narratives that question, agitate and challenge the loyal patriotism one finds in the hegemonic narrative. It is not merely true that our clothes and automobiles are often manu- factured throughout the manufacturing world; our very existence is inextricably tied up together with peoples, cultures and economies across the globe.
History textbooks that altogether avoid discussing the complicit relationship that multina- tional corporations and governments enjoy deliver a patently false understanding of the way that nation states function. Again, Loewen notes: 1103o textbook ever mentions the influence of multinationals on US policy. This is the case not necessarily because textbook authors are afraid of offending multinationals, but because they never discuss any influence on US policy. Loewen, , p. Com- mitments grounded in partiality may indeed supply us with the moral foundation on which to stand as we look outward from those communities.
Conclusions In this essay, I have argued against the deliberate promotion of loyal patriotism in schools because in doing so the State transgresses against the valid aims of education, engages in coercion, and discourages critical thinking and dissent. Liberal democratic states concerned with their legitimacy must encourage critical patriotism in their public schools. I have not argued that patriotism per se is unacceptable or that schools ought to erase all attachments from their schedules or operations.
What is to be guarded against are more odious forms of allegiance, particularly those which stir the emotion only to induce servility and uncritical attachment. Thus to the extent that school organization, curriculum content and design, and classroom instruction fosters and encourages unreflective, non-autonomous assent to the school or indeed to the nation state its curriculum describes, there are reasons to worry. Curriculum content is particularly relevant here. Historical inaccuracies—particularly where they are intentional—serve not only to falsify the examples bestowed to us by men and women of clay feet; they also undermine our critical consciousness, which is essential both to the develop- ment of autonomy and a healthy democracy.
I have not argued that students ought to read history simply in order to become political activists. Nor have I advocated for a critical patriotism whose purpose is to promote anti-government libertarianism or anarchism. Common bonds, no matter how fragile and tenuous, are important both for identity formation and political stability and amor patriae may very well have a legitimate place in the critical consciousness of any student of history.
Nevertheless, patriotism, if it is to be legitimate, must be freely assented to by well-informed individuals. After all, these truths, notably ones involving the abuse of power by the State, too often remain hidden from public view, and having access to these truths is one of the important aims of education. It is highly improbable that a capacity for dissent will lead to anarchism and political collapse in liberal democracies.
Rather, one is more likely to witness a renewed sense of political commitment that calls for reform, and this is entirely consistent with the type of critical patriotism I have defended. Whig social reformer, cited in Nasaw, , p. In no way does this remove the possibility that loyal patriotism will be absent. Indeed, much of American homeschooling and religious schooling is possibly more uncritically patriotic. Bellamy, like Walter Rausenbusch, was an advocate of the Social Gospel who believed the government had a greater role to play in combating social and economic inequities. One sees the powerful effects of this approach today when one considers both the titles of most American history textbooks and the patriotic symbols that adorn them Raphael, ; Loewen, By late , President McKinley had ordered more than 70, troops to the Philippines, this despite the claims of independence from the Philippine leaders.
The United States would step in to replace Spain as colonizer for another forty years. This idea eventually led to the doctrine of Manifest Destiny. Barnette Despite this fact, currently twenty-five states require the recitation of the Pledge in public schools. There have been religious and non-religious efforts to have the Pledge removed.
I have not undertaken a careful study of various textbook series myself; this work has been scrupulously done by others whose work is liberally cited in this essay. I gratefully build upon their important studies. To be sure, during Reconstruction a renewed call to take up justice and liberty for all reverberated throughout the land. This was to be a very short period indeed. With the election of Rutherford B. Hayes, federal troops began pulling out of Southern cities and the Republican Party withdrew its support for biracial government.
The actual textbook adoption process may entail local or statewide selection procedures, yet most states have no say over what is put into the textbooks themselves. Yet, by and large, the efforts thus far either have inclined toward stereotypes and tokenism or else literally pushed the minority voices to the margins. This has led Lisa Delpit , p. Academic research has, after all, found us genetically inferior, culturally deprived, and verbally deficient. Thus, far from lionizing the memory of Columbus, Zinn exposes Columbus for what he was: a conquistador interested mainly in the acquisition of gold and the mass conversion of non-Christian peoples by whatever means necessary.
We learn of the genocidal adventures of Columbus and his entourage, and there is little left of the Columbus myth i. Many years after his air raids of German and Czechoslovakian villages, Zinn returned to Europe to hear stories from survivors about the devastation those same air raids had on innocent civilians. Schlesinger is no opponent of the study of different cultures and embraces cultural pluralism.
But let us teach them as history, not as filiopietistic commemoration. The purpose of history is to promote not group self-esteem, but understanding of the world and the past, dispas- sionate analysis, judgment, and perspective, respect for divergent cultures and traditions, and unflinching protection for those unifying ideas of tolerance, democracy, and human rights that make free historical inquiry possible.
Schlesinger, , p. Criticism will falter and fail, however, if the threads are really cut, for the social critic must have standing among his fellow citizens. He exploits his connections, as it were, ot his disconnections.
If he hates his fellows and breaks his ties, why should they pay attention to what he says? One need not look to Alexander Cockburn or Lewis Lapham to criticize the abuses of power for which Rumsfeld and his War Cabinet are responsible on the torture of detainees. As evidence slowly came to light and as pressure from the European Union mounted , patriots of all sorts expressed moral outrage against the instances of American torture. In these instances, one witnessed massive amounts of bipartisan dissent and unremitting demand for reform.
Richard Rorty compellingly argues that the American Left would do well to learn from its reformist past rather than shun patriotism as the stuff of flag-waving conservatives. I cannot think of a single example where political corruption—even systemic corruption such as in Belgium during the Dutroux affair in the late s or the United States during the Watergate era—led to a groundswell movement to overthrow liberal democracy and replace it with another political system.
Archard, D. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 18, pp. Brighouse, H. Callan, E. Cottingham, J. Delfattore, J. Delpit, L. Erickson, F. Finn, C. Fullinwider, R. Fullinwider ed. Herman, B. Himmelfarb, G. Nussbaum ed. Hitchens, C. Kaestle, C. Loewen, J. Mason, A. McConnell, M. Merry, M. Ethics and Education, , pp.
Miller, D. Nasaw, D. Nash, G. New York, Vintage. Nash, M. Nussbaum, M. Raphael, R. Ravitch, D. Phi Delta Kappan, , pp. Rorty, R. Scheffler, S. Philosophy and Public Affairs, , pp. Schlesinger, A. Tyack, D. Walzer, M. Wills, G. Zembylas, M. Zinn, H. The primary aim of this document is to pave the way for the deepening of a democratic, united and non-racial society. The Manifesto takes these qualities further and explores how a democratic citizenship education agenda based on the ideals of democracy, social justice, equality, non-racism and non-sexism, ubuntu human dignity , an open society, accountability responsibility , the rule of law, respect, and reconciliation can be taught as part of the school curriculum DoE, , p.
How does the Manifesto relate to existing ideas on democratic citizenship education? And by creating a civil space—referred to by Benhabib , p. Put differently, when people are engaged in a conversation underpinned by interdependence and disagreement, they engage in an educative process with a collective identity: they share commonalities. And educating learners to become democratic citizens involves creating civil spaces whereby they can learn to share commonalities and to respect the differences of others.
Secondly, educating people to be democratic citizens involves making them aware of the right to political participation, the right to hold certain offices and perform certain tasks, and the right to deliberate and decide upon certain questions Benhabib, , p. The point is that people need to be educated to accept that they cannot be excluded from holding certain positions or performing certain tasks on the basis of their cultural differences.
Of particular importance to this discussion is the notion of educating people about the right to deliberate and decide on certain questions. What this implies is that we should recognise the right of people capable of speech and action to be participants in the moral conversation in which they should have the same rights to various speech acts, to initiate new topics and to ask for justification of the presuppositions of the conversation Benhabib, , p. Only then do people become participants in an educative process underpinned by democratic citizenship.
Thirdly, democratic citizenship education also involves educating people about their civil, political and social rights. Such a process would educate people about the right to protection of life, liberty and property, the right to freedom of conscience, and certain associational rights, such as those of contract and marriage: all civil rights. People would also be educated about the rights to self-determination, to hold and run for office, to enjoy freedom of speech and opinion, and to establish political and non-political associations, including a free press and free institutions of science and culture: that is, political rights.
And they would be educated about the right to form trade unions as well as other professional and trade associations, health care rights, unemployment compensation, old-age pensions, child care, housing and educational subsidies: that is, social rights Benhabib, , pp. An education that takes into account these issues is underpinned by democracy and citizenship. However, the Manifesto is not without its dilemmas. One such dilemma seems to be connected to a parochial treatment of patriotism. I promise to show self-respect in all that I do and to respect all of my fellow citizens and all of our various traditions.
Let us work for peace, friendship and reconciliation and heal the scars left by past conflicts. What is so pernicious about such a view of patriotism? Both totalitarian and democratic states desire patriotism. More recently, some members of the African National Congress ANC government felt that criticising the policies of the new democratic state was tantamount to expressing unpatriotic sentiments.
Of course, questioning and criticising the policies of the ANC government does not imply disloyalty to the country. In fact patriotism is not inconsistent with criticism. Often these immigrant communities are subjected to indifference and cruelty and sometimes to hatred and assassinations. For instance, in June Somali shopkeepers were gunned down in the Khay- elitsha area of Cape Town, apparently for minimising job opportunities for locals. Likewise, I sometimes hear my doctoral student from Malawi complaining how he has experienced moments of stigmatisation and isolation.
This brings me to a discussion of why blind patriotism cannot credibly engender peace, friendship and reconciliation. Why is this situation possibly a dilemma for the cultivation of peace, friendship and reconciliation? In the first place, peaceful human coexistence and non-aggression would not be possible if democratic citizens are not engaged in relations of friendship. Taking my cue from Nancy Sherman , friendship, firstly, can take the form of mutual attachment—a matter of doing things together—where both teachers and learners demonstrate a willingness to give priority to one another in terms of time and resources.
In other words, when teaching and learning take place, both teachers and learners avoid being dismissive of one another: that is, they listen with interest and appreciation to one another. In this way, the possibility that they correct one another as well as learning from the strengths of wisdom of one another in an atmosphere of trust, goodwill and mutual benefit is enhanced Sherman, , pp. When learners and teachers attend to one another with interest and appreciation in an atmosphere of non-dismissiveness, they care for one another in such a way that both their potentialities are evoked.
For instance, when learners produce arguments, they are not afraid of being corrected by teachers and other learners. They are also not concerned that their judgements will be dismissed by teachers. In a different way, I find my learners becoming more critical if I become attached to them: that is, their views are listened to with interest, appreciation and care. In turn, learners expect to be corrected if their reasons cannot be justified. In this way friendship is nurtured and the possibility of attending to the reasons of learners in an atmosphere of respect and sharing carries considerable weight.
Secondly, Sherman , p. When learners and teachers engage in argumentation on the basis that they relax their boundaries, it seems rather unlikely that their deliberations will result in hostile antagonism and conflicts that could potentially thwart their dialogical engagement. However, my potential critic might quite correctly claim that deliberative argumentation favours those learners who are eloquent and that not all students can defensibly articulate their views. If teachers do so, the possibility of mutual attunement will further be enhanced. I cannot imagine learners becoming critical if they are prematurely excluded from learning on the grounds that they lack certain levels of articulation.
This means that, when teachers teach, they initiate learners into new understandings and meanings not perhaps thought of before. Similarly, when learners learn, they de construct meanings in ways that open up new possibilities for their learning. In this way teaching and learning are continuous because every initiative teachers and learners take is considered as opening up possibilities to see things anew—that is, meanings are always provisional and the outcomes of education are inconclusive.
What follows from such a view of teaching and learning is that the outcomes of education are always incomplete and the possibility of something new arising always seems to be there. Such a form of mutual action gives much hope for critical learning on the basis that the learning is connected to something new arising. To my mind, the possibility of realising reconciliation in a country still suffering from the scars of apartheid discrimination and segregation would be real if learners were taught what it meant to act with trust, to appreciate the other, and to open up opportunities to start anew—what Arendt refers to as forgiveness.
I agree with the Manifesto that nurturing a culture of dialogue should not happen at the expense of muting the voices of participants in the dialogue through what I would refer to as irresponsible expression. Those teachers and learners serious about cultivating forgiveness ought to become respectful, because respect requires of one not just to express oneself freely, but also responsibly. This means free expression should not become what Gutmann , p.
In other words, the right to free and unconstrained expression ends when injustice to others begins. One can no longer lay claim to being respectful and therefore being responsible, critical and just if one advocates a particular point of view that cannot be separated from excluding certain individuals— that is, discriminating invidiously against others particularly those individuals in society who are most vulnerable and who lack the same expressive freedom or capacity as those who are excluding them on grounds such as gender, race, sexual orientation, ethnicity and religion Gutmann, , p.
If the Dan Roodts of this world continue to express themselves with unhindered freedom, making unsubstantiated claims about the supposed aggression and murderous instincts of South African Blacks all in the name of criticism , the possibilities for civic reconciliation and nation building will be seriously thwarted.
The point I am making is that such unconstrained, irresponsible expressions are in fact disrespectful and uncritical utterances, which do not offer possibilities for civic reconciliation to be achieved in our ten-year-old democracy. Yes, becoming respectful would be a matter of constraining our irresponsible speech.
Only then would we enter a field of wider possibilities—of connecting with all South Africans in the quest to achieve civic reconciliation. Of course one could argue that Roodt himself lacks an expressive capacity because his insensitive comments about Blacks seriously undermine the noble aims of reconciliation and nation building.
For me, responsible expression has to do with taking risks through belligerent action, whereas safe expression tries to avoid causing distress and discomfort to the other which can also be through retribution and victimisation. Through deliberation, teachers and learners disturb complacency or provoke doubts about the correctness of their moral beliefs or about the importance of the differences between what they and others believe a matter of arousing distress accompanied by a rough process of struggle and ethical confrontation—that is, belligerence Callan, , p. If this happens, belligerence and distress give way eventually to moments of ethical conciliation, when the truth and error in rival positions have been made clear and a fitting synthesis of factional viewpoints is achieved Callan, , p.
This is an idea of deliberation with which I agree—where no-one has the right to silence dissent and where participants can speak their minds. And when teachers and learners can speak their minds, they are also prepared to take risks that will place them favourably in relation to enhancing justice in their society. It is such a notion of responsible expression both through speech and just action that can contribute toward cultivating a democratic form of patriotism necessary to enact reconciliation and nation building.
The upshot of this is that all people including immigrant communities will be treated equally by others and that they people will be free to critique the nation state and openly discuss their commonalities and differences. Firstly, for learners to have acquired freedom means that they have been provoked by teachers to reach beyond themselves, to wonder, to imagine and to pose their own questions. In short, freedom implies that learners have developed the capacity to imagine alternative possibilities and that their teachers have succeeded in establishing spaces whereby meanings can be shared, understood, reflected on and contested.
They have not been silenced on the ground of dissent—what Michael Apple , p. This implies that freedom does not become a preoccupation with self-dependence or self-regulated behaviour, but rather an involvement with others—a communal practice. Often reconciliation requires that learners imagine the undisclosed, to come up with alternative possibilities and to prepare the ground for what is to come. Hannah Arendt , pp. Put differently, freedom opens the door for the enhancement of reconciliation; without freedom, there is no recognition of responsible human expression and, hence, the unlikelihood of reconciliation.
And the commitments My contention is that the idea of a democratic community is apposite to South Africa as the country and its people endeavour to move away from their apartheid past toward a long-term commitment to ensuring non-racism, non-sexism and the achievement of social justice in all spheres of private and public life, which involves providing benefits individually such as social security, income support, education and health care Miller, , p.
I agree with Baumann b, pp. Such an idea of education can lead to responsible action both in terms of speech and deed that underscores the notion of democratic patriotism—one that would go far toward ensuring reconciliation and nation building. Note 1. We will respect and protect the dignity of each person and stand up for justice.
When I asked some white postgraduate students in education of this pledge, they all claimed that the pledge makes them feel guilty for past apartheid injustices which they had not been responsible for. Some black students felt that recognising injustices of the apartheid past does not seem to be a pernicious action. My view is that such a pledge could create conditions for blind patriotism when people honour those who suffered and sacrificed for justice and freedom against apartheid without questioning some of the actions of liberation movements.
References Apple, M. Arendt, H. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press. Baumann, Z. Benhabib, S. Greene, M. Gutmann, A. Kahne, J.
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Dowding, R. Sherman, N. Young, I. Benhabib ed. This has been promoted in tandem with the notion of advancing New Zealand as a knowledge economy and society. The new patriotism encourages New Zealanders to accept, indeed embrace, a single, shared vision of the future: one structured by a neoliberal ontology and the demands of global capitalism. This constructs a narrow view of citizenship and reduces the possibility of economic and social alternatives being considered seriously.
The paper makes this case in relation to tertiary education in particular. This is followed by a critique of the Strategy and an analysis of the model of citizenship implied by it. The paper concludes with brief comments on the role tertiary education might play in contesting the new patriotism. With globalisation and the development of new information and communication technologies, some of the older boundaries between countries have become more permeable.
At the same time, following the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September , new divisions have emerged. Patriotism has reasserted itself more strongly than ever in the US context. The patriotic fervour following the events of 11 September was sufficient to support US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the re-election of George Bush in New Zealand has occupied a somewhat ambivalent position in relation to these world events. New Zealand is a minor player on the world economic stage and seldom rates a mention in news and current affairs elsewhere in the world.
There is little evidence to suggest that patriotism of the kind exhibited by millions in the US in recent years has prevailed in the New Zealand context. The election of the fourth Labour government in marked the beginning of a process of rapid and dramatic reform, with the sale of state assets, the removal of trade barriers, and the imple- mentation of corporate management practices in public institutions, among other changes.
The marketisation of education saw principles such as collegiality and trust replaced by contractualism and performance indicators. In education, the emphasis on student choice so dominant in the s has been reduced, more attention has been paid to the aspirations of Maori and Pasifika peoples, and a number of new opportunities for specialisation and collaboration have emerged. At the same time, much has not changed. Economic imperatives continue to dominate.
The key motif in post education policy has been to advance New Zealand as a knowledge economy and society. In some respects, competition has increased under the Labour-led governments of recent years. The introduction of performance based research funding has sharpened the competitive ethos within and between tertiary education institutions Codd, ; Roberts, The Third Way, in practice, has turned out to be still very much a neoliberal way Codd, ; Roberts, The paper will make this case in relation to tertiary education in particular.
This was the second document of its kind in recent years, the first Tertiary Education Strategy having appeared in Ministry of Education, The two documents are similar in purpose, scope and style. Both set out government priorities for the tertiary education sector for a five year period. Both are strong on presentation, with glossy colour pictures throughout, but light on theory, argument and research. Both include a Ministerial Foreword, a brief discussion of the context for the implementation of the new strategy, comments on expectations of the tertiary education sector, the specification of key goals and the means for achieving them, and a section on the monitoring of new developments.
The first Strategy followed the work of the Tertiary Education Advisory Commission TEAC , a body established shortly after the formation of the Labour-Alliance government with the task of reviewing the whole tertiary education sector. In the TEAC reports the role of tertiary education in the development of a knowledge society and economy was considered at some length. The new Strategy, it is noted, continues the inclusive orientation of the first Tertiary Education Strategy Ministry of Education, , but with a sharper focus. A broad approach was necessary in the first Strategy to address the diversity of the tertiary education sector.
The new Strategy recognises the need for tertiary education to enhance Maori educational achievement and respond to the aspirations of Pasifika peoples. Tertiary education, as conceived in the new Strategy, refers to all post-school education. If New Zealanders are to meet these challenges they will need to build global awareness, improve productivity and innovation, recognise the distinctive needs of diverse groups, facilitate the positive development of Maori knowledge and enterprise, and assist in understanding and protecting the natural environment pp.
From , the government will implement a new approach to the funding, planning, and monitoring of the New Zealand tertiary education system. There will be a three-year funding path, with investment based on a negotiated Plan. There will be a stronger focus on outcomes, and with better quality performance information transparency in the performance of the tertiary education system will increase.
Trumpism: a disfigured Americanism | Palgrave Communications
It is recognised that different tertiary education institutions and organisations—e. The emphasis will be on educational success. The document claims further: When New Zealanders succeed in tertiary education, they can contribute fully to our economy and society. The kinds of knowledge, skills and competencies that enable people to succeed in a knowledge-based economy are increasingly similar to those that enable people to enjoy and contribute positively to their families and communities.
First, they should allow success for all New Zealanders through lifelong learning. The second form of contribution is the creation and application of knowledge to drive innovation. This will come from supporting links between research, scholarship and teaching, from focusing resources for greatest effect, and from improving research connections and linkages. Finally, there is an expectation that tertiary education organisations will forge strong connections with the communities they serve. The connections here will be those that improve the quality and relevance of education and knowledge, support economic transformation, and support social, cultural and environmental outcomes pp.
First, however, it is important to acknowledge some positive changes signalled by the Strategy. The move away from the demand- driven approach of the s will allow for better planning and proper recognition of the distinctive roles played by different institutions and organisations in the sector. This could reduce the proliferation of courses and programmes designed to compete with those already well established in other institutions. The distinctive contribution universities make to research and postgraduate study can also now be better recognised. Adult and community education receive more attention in the new Strategy than they have in the past.
The government has, moreover, continued to express a strong commitment to Maori and Pasifika communities in its goals and priorities for tertiary education. Changing demographic patterns in New Zealand, and their possible implications for tertiary education, have been considered. At a surface level, the new Strategy is distinguished more by its banality than anything else. No theme receives in-depth discussion. There is little reference to research in tertiary education or related areas.
Arguments are, for the most part, poorly developed. The Strategy does employ graphs to good effect in demonstrating demographic patterns, participation rates, and qualification completions, but these are not analysed in detail. As the dominant theme for what is portrayed as a significant new direction in tertiary education policy this seems stunningly underwhelming. The glossary at the end of the document is perhaps the most explicit. It can also be taken to mean there is wide, if not universal, agreement over the problems faced by a country and the solutions necessary to address those problems.
This is the position conveyed, implicitly, by the new Strategy. The term is employed in a variety of ways and its meaning in the document remains ambiguous. A statement earlier in the Strategy is a little more specific. Questions of citizenship receive little overt consideration in the Strategy. The ideal citizen will be creative, innovative, competitive, and entrepreneurial.
It is taken as given that all New Zealanders will embrace the goal of creating an internationally competitive knowledge-based economy. This overarching goal has been in place as a cornerstone of Labour-led government policy for several years now. The emphasis in the Tertiary Education Strategy, —12, as was the case with the earlier Strategy, is very much on economic goals. Yet, very little is said about social life. The document refers, directly and indirectly, to social development goals in various places, but such references lack substantive detail and explanation.
There is not a single critical question posed about globalisation. New Zealanders are simply encouraged to develop the skills, knowledge and attitudes that will enable them to succeed in world markets. The arts and humanities are rendered virtually invisible in the document and their role, along with other subject areas, in building a richer cultural life for New Zealanders appears to have been largely ignored. The Strategy has nothing to say about what it means to know.
There is no comment on the ways in which knowing might differ from believing or opining. The role of knowledge in the development of citizenship remains unclear, but the implication of both the first and the second Strategy documents is that people will be able to employ what passes as knowledge to pursue extrinsic—and predominantly economic— goals.
The TEAC reports particularly TEAC, paid brief attention to the idea of knowledge having intrinsic as well as extrinsic value, but in the Strategy documents this notion is neither supported strongly nor explored. The Strategy implies that New Zealand has only one future. This future is structured by the rules of global capitalism and centres on the advancement of New Zealand as a so-called knowledge economy. New Zealand citizens are expected not merely to accept this future, but to embrace it.
Doing so, the Strategy suggests, will involve a harnessing of creative energies for product innovation, the development of a competitive economic ethos, and the promotion of a culture of entrepreneurialism. The underlying ontology here is still neoliberal in its orientation. It is also expected that connections will be made between tertiary education institutions and the communities they serve.
This is, however, by no means an endorsement for a form of communitarianism. The rules of the market—now very much the international market—continue to dominate, and the mode of being promoted in the Strategy is more individualistic than communitarian in spirit. The communities to be served are predominantly those connected with economic advancement.
Apart from comments specifically devoted to Maori and Pasifika communities and these remarks do not provide a model of in-depth, critical analysis , little reference is made to other communities. To create, market and sell high-value products and services will require a strong focus on the global marketplace, and sophisticated new skills and knowledge. It will also require a culture of continuous inquiry, innovation and improvement— and of risk-taking and entrepreneurship. It is noted that the world is becoming a smaller place, and that globalisation and technological change demand new skills and knowledge.
Maintaining first-world living standards will, it is suggested, require an active response to these trends. These ideas are taken as already established and accepted in the second Strategy. The version of patriotism conveyed, explicitly or implicitly, by both documents is one in which New Zealanders are expected to love their country for its natural beauty, its lack of overcrowding, its distinctive location relative to the rest of the world, its tradition of innovativeness and creativity, and its culture of risk-taking and entrepreneurialism.
This combination of physical and attitudinal characteristics serves several functions. This is meant to be a shared vision, and there is, consistent with most attempts to generate patriotic support, a strong emphasis on cohesiveness in the pursuit of national goals see Roberts, Accepting this patriotic challenge demands, however, that certain key tensions be ignored. There is, for example, a fundamental tension between a commitment to communitarian values on the one hand and competition on the other. The imperative to compete clearly wins out here, and the appeal to a spirit of community and inclusion becomes harnessed to the wider drive to position New Zealand as an effective player in world economic markets.
Similarly, the distinctive traditions and cultural attributes of New Zealanders warrant consideration not in their own right but for their value in improving economic performance. This form of patriotism is thus based on a narrow conception of possibilities for New Zealanders. Final Remarks: The Need for Critique and Alternatives Given such a restricted range of possibilities, what can be said about the role of tertiary education in New Zealand society?
With the new Strategy, the government has made much of the fact that different tertiary education institutions and organisations are expected to contribute in distinctive ways to meeting key goals for the country. On the face of it, this might seem to provide an ideal opportunity to discuss the different forms of knowledge and understanding emphasised in the various institutions. This opportunity has been taken up to only a limited degree in the document. It is noted that private training establishments and adult and community education providers will play key roles in improving foundation skills and learning Ministry of Education, , p.
Universities will: 1. A striking omission from the comments in this section is any detailed reference to the role of universities—or other institutions—in promoting critical investigation or understanding. The role of critique was largely ignored in the earlier Strategy see Roberts, , and here it appears, if anything, to be an even lower priority. There is only fleeting reference to this legal obligation in the new Strategy.
Indeed, the Strategy makes it clear that if tertiary education institutions and organisations are to receive continued support from the government, they will need to fall into line with the goals and expectations set out in the document. Given the considerable sums of public money devoted to the tertiary education sector, this is perhaps hardly surprising. A knowledge society need not be conceived in the narrow terms implied by the two Strategy documents. This dates back decades see Peters, and, in the light of the current obsession with advancing New Zealand as a knowledge society and economy, warrants revisiting.
A knowledge society can be more than a knowledge economy. Finding out why and how this might be so, by placing the ideals in their appropriate historical and theoretical contexts, can itself play a part in creating a genuine knowledge society—a society in which critical investigation has a central place. The notion of citizenship, similarly, invites further reflection. There is, as Keogh points out, a dizzying array of different notions of citizenship, and the narrow concept conveyed by the Tertiary Education Strategy documents both the and versions stands in opposition to many of the alternatives.
Allowing students the opportunity to explore a range other conceptions of citizenship—e. Moreover, in undertaking this scholarly work, students become citizens of a particular kind. If such work proceeds optimally, they become critical, questioning, thoughtful, open-minded, well informed members of New Zealand society. They will, nonetheless, through this very process, also be able to appreciate that not everyone values this form of citizenship. There is little evidence of this kind of critical reflexivity in the Strategy documents and this narrowness of vision has the potential to undermine some of the very ideals the government wishes to promote.
The new patriotism places a premium on innovation and creativity as defining features of New Zealand life. There is a lack, however, of a longer term historical perspective in considering how these attributes might be developed and applied. No consideration has been given to the possibility of a world dominated by an economic and political system other than global capitalism. Yet, an understanding of history would suggest that capitalism, like other modes of production before it, will eventually be superseded by new forms of social and economic organisation.
The new patriotism is, despite the rhetoric of creativity and innovation, essentially reactive; it assumes a certain state of world affairs, does not question this, and encourages all New Zealanders to fall in behind a shared vision dominated by an ethos of international economic competitiveness. Why is territory important for ethno-national groups, and what are the extent and grounds of territorial rights? Its primary importance resides in sovereignty and all the associated possibilities for internal control and external exclusion. What about the grounds for the demand for territorial rights?
Nationalist and pro-nationalist views mostly rely on the attachment that members of a nation have to national territory and to the formative value of territory for a nation to justify territorial claims see Miller and Meissels , with some refinements discussed below. These attachment views stand in stark contrast to more pragmatic views about territorial rights as means for conflict resolution e.
Another quite popular alternative is the family of individualistic views grounding territorial rights in rights and interests of individuals, for instance in their human rights Buchanan , pre-political Lockean property rights Simmons , individual resource rights Steiner , or political association rights Wellman Some of the authors mentioned are cosmopolitan critics of nationalism, most prominently Buchanan and Pogge. We now pass to the normative dimension of nationalism.
We shall first describe the very heart of the nationalist program, i. These claims can be seen as answers to the normative subset of our initial questions about 1 pro-national attitudes and 2 actions. We will see that these claims recommend various courses of action: centrally, those meant to secure and sustain a political organization — preferably a state — for the given ethno-cultural national community thereby making more specific the answers to our normative questions 1e , 1f , 2b , and 2c.
Finally, we shall discuss various lines of pro-nationalist thought that have been put forward in defense of these claims. To begin, let us return to the claims concerning the furthering of the national state and culture. These are proposed by the nationalist as norms of conduct.
The philosophically most important variations concern three aspects of such normative claims:. The strongest claim is typical of classical nationalism; its typical norms are both moral and, once the nation-state is in place, legally enforceable obligations for all parties concerned, including for the individual members of the ethno-nation.
The force of the nationalist claim is here being weighed against the force of other claims, including those of individual or group interests or rights. Variations in comparative strength of nationalist claims take place on a continuum between two extremes. At one rather unpalatable extreme, nation-focused claims take precedence over any other claims, including over human rights.
Further towards the center is the classical nationalism that gives nation-centered claims precedence over individual interests and many needs including pragmatic collective utility , but not necessarily over general human rights. See, for example, McIntyre , Oldenquist On the opposite end, which is mild, humane and liberal, the central nationalist claims are accorded prima facie status only see Tamir , Gans , and most recently Miller's book, which looks for a compromise.
What is their scope? One approach claims that they are valid for every ethno-nation and thereby universal. To put it more officially. The most difficult and indeed chauvinistic sub-case of particularism, i. Classical nationalism comes in both particularistic and universalistic varieties. Although the three dimensions of variation — internal strength, comparative strength, and scope — are logically independent, they are psychologically and politically intertwined.
People who are radical in one respect tend also to be radical in other respects. In other words, certain clusters of attitudes appear to be most stable, so that extreme or moderate attitudes on one dimension psychologically and politically belong with extreme or moderate ones on others. Pairing extreme attitudes on one dimension with moderate ones on the others is psychologically and socially unstable.
Put starkly, the view is that morality ends at the boundaries of the nation-state; beyond there is nothing but anarchy. The view is explicit in Friederich Meinecke , Introduction and Raymond Aron and very close to the surface in Hans Morgenthau ; for interesting links with contemporary nationalisms, see the paper by Michael C. Williams and the book edited by Duncan Bell It nicely complements the main classical nationalist claim about nation-state, i. Let us return to our initial normative question centered around 1 attitudes and 2 actions.
Is national partiality justified, and to what extent? What actions are appropriate to bring about sovereignty?
In particular, are ethno-national states and institutionally protected ethno- national cultures goods independent from the individual will of their members, and how far may one go in protecting them? The philosophical debate for and against nationalism is a debate about the moral validity of its central claims. In particular the ultimate moral issue is the following: is any form of nationalism morally permissible or justified, and, if not, how bad are particular forms of it?
For debates on partiality in general, see Chatterjee and Smith and, more recently, Feltham and Cottingham Why do nationalist claims require a defense? In some situations they seem plausible: for instance, the plight of some stateless national groups — the history of Jews and Armenians, the historical and contemporary misfortunes of Kurds — lends credence to the idea that having their own state would have solved the worst problems.
Still, there are good reasons to examine nationalist claims more carefully. The most general reason is that it should first be shown that the political form of nation state has some value as such, that a national community has a particular, or even central, moral and political value, and that claims in its favor have normative validity. Once this is established, a further defense is needed.
Some classical nationalist claims appear to clash — at least under normal circumstances of contemporary life — with various values that people tend to accept. Some of these values are considered essential to liberal-democratic societies, while others are important specifically for the flourishing of creativity and culture. The main values in the first set are individual autonomy and benevolent impartiality most prominently towards members of groups culturally different from one's own.
The alleged special duties towards one's ethno-national culture can and often do interfere with individuals' right to autonomy. Also, construed too strictly these duties can interfere with other individual rights, e. Many feminist authors have noted that the typical nationalist suggestion that women have a moral obligation to give birth to new members of the nation and to nurture them for the sake of the nation clashes with both the autonomy and the privacy of these women Yuval-Davis , Moller-Okin , and , and the discussion in the volume on Okin, Satz et al.
Another endangered value is diversity within the ethno-national community, which can also be thwarted by the homogeneity of a central national culture. Nation-oriented duties also interfere with the value of unconstrained creativity. For example, telling writers, musicians or philosophers that they have a special duty to promote national heritage interferes with the freedom of creation. The question here is not whether these individuals have the right to promote their national heritage, but whether they have a duty to do so.
Between these two sets of endangered values, the autonomy-centered and creativity-centered ones, fall values that seem to arise from ordinary needs of people living under ordinary circumstances Barry In many modern states, citizens of different ethnic background live together and very often value this kind of life. The very fact of cohabitation seems to be a good that should be upheld. Nationalism does not tend to foster this kind of multiculturalism and pluralism, judging from both theory especially the classical nationalist one and experience. But the problems get worse. In practice, it does not seem accidental that the invidious particularistic form of nationalism, claiming rights for one's own people and denying them to others, is so widespread.
The source of the problem is the competition for scarce resources: as Ernst Gellner famously pointed out, there is too little territory for all candidate ethnic groups to have a state, and the same goes for other goods demanded by nationalists for the exclusive use of their co-nationals. According to some authors McCabe , the invidious variant is more coherent than any other form of nationalism: if one values one's own ethnic group highly the simplest way is to value it tout court. If one definitely prefers one's own culture in all respects to any foreign one, it is a waste of time and attention to bother about others.
The universalist, non-invidious variant introduces enormous psychological and political complications. These arise from a tension between spontaneous attachment to one's own community and the demand to regard all communities with an equal eye. This tension might make the humane, non-invidious position psychologically unstable, difficult to uphold in situations of conflict and crisis, and politically less efficient.
Philosophers sympathetic to nationalism are aware of the evils that historical nationalism has produced and usually distance themselves from these. In order to help the reader find his or her way through this involved debate, we shall briefly summarize the considerations which are open to the ethno-nationalist to defend his or her case.
Compare the useful overview in Lichtenberg Further lines of thought built upon these considerations can be used to defend very different varieties of nationalism, from radical to very moderate ones. It is important to offer a warning concerning the key assumptions and premises figuring in each of the lines of thought summarized below: namely, that the assumptions often live an independent life in the philosophical literature.
Some of them figure in the proposed defenses of various traditional views which have little to do with the concept of a nation in particular. For brevity, I shall reduce each line of thought to a brief argument; the actual debate is more involved than one can represent in a sketch. I shall indicate, in brackets, some prominent lines of criticism that have been put forward in the debate.
These are discussed in greater detail in Miscevic The main arguments in favor of nationalism purporting to establish its fundamental claims about state and culture will be divided into two sets. The first set of arguments defends the claim that national communities have a high value, often seen as non-instrumental and independent of the wishes and choices of their individual members, and argues that they should therefore be protected by means of state and official statist policies.
The first set will be presented here in more detail, since it has formed the core of the debate. It depicts the community as the deep source of value or as the unique transmission device connecting its members to some important values. Here is a characterization. The general form of deep communitarian arguments is as follows. First, the communitarian premise: there is some uncontroversial good e. Then comes the claim that the ethno-cultural nation is the kind of community ideally suited for this task.
Unfortunately, this crucial claim is rarely defended in detail in the literature. But here is a sample from Margalit, whose last sentence has been already quoted above:. Then follows the statist conclusion: in order for such a community to preserve its own identity and support the identity of its members, it has to assume always or at least normally the political form of a state. The conclusion of this type of argument is that the ethno-national community has the right to an ethno-national state and the citizens of the state have the right and obligation to favor their own ethnic culture in relation to any other.
Although the deeper philosophical assumptions in the arguments stem from the communitarian tradition, weakened forms have also been proposed by more liberal philosophers. The original communitarian lines of thought in favor of nationalism suggest that there is some value in preserving ethno-national cultural traditions, in feelings of belonging to a common nation, and in solidarity between a nation's members. A liberal nationalist might claim that these are not the central values of political life but are values nevertheless. Moreover, the diametrically opposing views, pure individualism and cosmopolitanism, do seem arid, abstract, and unmotivated by comparison.
By cosmopolitanism I shall understand a moral and political doctrine of the following sort:. Critics of cosmopolitanism sometimes argue that these two claims are incoherent, since human beings generally strive best under some global institutional arrangement like ours that concentrates power and authority at the level of states.
Confronted with opposing forces of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, many philosophers opt for a mixture of liberalism-cosmopolitanism and patriotism-nationalism. In his writings B. Hilary Putnam proposes loyalty to what is best in the multiple traditions in which each of us participates, apparently a middle way between a narrow-minded patriotism and an overly abstract cosmopolitanism ibid , The compromise has been foreshadowed by Berlin , and Taylor , and its various versions worked out in considerable detail by authors such as Yael Tamir , David Miller , , , Kai Nielsen , Michel Seymour and Chaim Gans See also the debate around Miller's work in De Schutter and Tinnevelt In the last two decades it has occupied center stage in the debate and even provoked re-readings of historical nationalism in its light, for instance in Miller a , Sung Ho Kim or Brian Vick Most liberal nationalist authors accept various weakened versions of the arguments we list below, taking them to support moderate or ultra-moderate nationalist claims.
It is important to mention here a more utopian proposal due to Chandran Kukathas , which nicely combines multicultural pluralism with the distinctiveness of particular communities that classical nationalism celebrates. Some of these individual islands might be quite unpleasant by liberal standards; what makes the archipelago liberal overall is that each community guarantees its dissenting members the right to exit which might have a high price, if former members have nowhere to go with any prospect for a decent life. The first level of political organization might thus be non-liberal Kukathas hopes it will not turn out to be so , while the second level would be strongly liberal.
The proposal nicely combines the traditional features of classical nationalism with very liberal, almost anarchic traits of the whole. Unfortunately, it is hard to see what would keep such an archipelago together without a strong unifying state, which Kukathas would not have. A clear danger is a slide towards a multipolar achipelago, with some big and powerful islands say, a huge Islamic island, a huge EU-type island, and so on.
Let me return to the main line of exposition. Here are the main weakenings of classical ethno-nationalism that liberal, limited-liberal and cosmopolitan nationalists propose. First, ethno-national claims have only prima facie strength, and cannot trump individual rights. Second, legitimate ethno-national claims do not in themselves automatically amount to the right to a state, but rather to the right to a certain level of cultural autonomy. The main models of autonomy are either territorial or non-territorial: the first involves territorial devolution; the second, cultural autonomy granted to individuals regardless of their domicile within the state.
Third, ethno-nationalism is subordinate to civic patriotism, which has little or nothing to do with ethnic criteria. Finally, any legitimacy that ethno-national claims may have is to be derived from choices the concerned individuals are free to make. Consider now the particular arguments from the first set.
The first argument depends on assumptions that also appear in the subsequent ones, but it further ascribes to the community an intrinsic value. The later arguments point more towards an instrumental value of nation, derived from the value of individual flourishing, moral understanding, firm identity and the like. Each ethno-national community is valuable in and of itself since it is only within the natural encompassing framework of various cultural traditions that important meanings and values are produced and transmitted. The members of such communities share a special cultural proximity to each other.
By speaking the same language and sharing customs and traditions, the members of these communities are typically closer to one another in various ways than they are to those who don't share the same culture. The community thereby becomes a network of morally connected agents, i. A prominent obligation of each individual concerns the underlying traits of the ethnic community, above all language and customs: they ought to be cherished, protected, preserved and reinforced. The general assumption that moral obligations increase with cultural proximity is often criticized as problematic.
Moreover, even if we grant this general assumption in theory, it breaks down in practice. Nationalist activism is most often turned against close and substantially similar neighbors rather than against distant strangers, so that in many important contexts the appeal to proximity will not work. It might, however, retain its potential force against culturally distant groups.
The ethno-national community is essential for each of its members to flourish. In particular, it is only within such a community that an individual can acquire concepts and values crucial for understanding the community's cultural life in general and the individual's own life in particular. There has been much debate on the pro-nationalist side about whether divergence of values is essential for separateness of national groups.
Taylor , concluded that it is not separateness of value that matters. Critics of nationalism point out that flourishing might have too high a price, especially in the form of aggressiveness towards neighbors. Communitarian philosophers emphasize nurture over nature as the principal force determining our identity as people — we come to be who we are because of the social settings and contexts in which we mature.
This claim certainly has some plausibility. For example, Nielsen writes:. Given that an individual's morality depends upon their having a mature and stable personal identity, the communal conditions that foster the development of personal identity must be preserved and encouraged. For the opposite line, denying the importance of fixed and homogenous identity and proposing hybrid identities, see the papers in Iyall Smith and Leavy Philosophical nationalists claim that the nation is the right format for preserving and encouraging such identity-providing communities.
Therefore, communal life should be organized around particular national cultures. The classical nationalist proposes that cultures should be given their own states, while the liberal nationalist proposes that cultures should get at least some form of political protection. A particularly important variety of value is moral value. Some values are universal, e. The nation offers a natural framework for moral traditions, and thereby for moral understanding; it is the primary school of morals.
I note in fairness that Taylor himself is ambivalent about the national format of morality. An often-noticed problem with this line of thought is that particular nations do not each have a special morality of their own. Each national culture contributes uniquely to the diversity of human cultures. The most famous twentieth century proponent of the idea, Isaiah Berlin interpreting Herder, who first saw this idea as significant , writes:. The carrier of basic value is thus the totality of cultures, from which each national culture and style of life that contributes to the totality derives its own value.
The argument from diversity is therefore pluralistic: it ascribes value to each particular culture from the viewpoint of the collective totality of cultures. Assuming that the ethno- nation is the natural unit of culture, the preservation of cultural diversity amounts to institutionally protecting the purity of ethno- national culture.
A pragmatic inconsistency might threaten this argument. The issue is who can legitimately propose ethno-national diversity as ideal: the nationalist is much too tied to his or her own culture to do it, while the cosmopolitan is too eager to preserve intercultural links that go beyond the idea of having a single nation-state. Moreover, is diversity a value such that it deserves to be protected whenever it exists? Should the protection of diversity be restricted to certain aspects of culture s proposed in full generality? The line of thought 1 is not individualistic.
And 5 can be presented without reference to individuals: diversity may be good in its own right, or may be good for nations. But the other lines of thought in the set just presented are all linked to the importance of community life in relation to the individual. In each argument, there is a general communitarian premise a community, to which one has no choice whether or not to belong, is crucial for one's identity, or for flourishing or some other important good.
This premise is coupled with the more narrow, nation-centered descriptive claim that the ethno-nation is precisely the kind of community ideally suited for the task. However, liberal nationalists do not find these arguments completely persuasive. In their view, the premises of the arguments may not support the full package of nationalist ambitions and may not be unconditionally valid. For an even more skeptical view stemming from social science, see Hale Still, there is a lot to these arguments, and they might support liberal nationalism and a more modest stance in favor of national cultures.
We conclude this sub-section by pointing to an interesting and sophisticated pro-national stance that developed by David Miller over the course of decades, from his work of to the most recent work of He accepts multicultural diversity within a society but stresses an overarching national identity, taking as his prime example British national identity, which encompasses the English, Scottish and other ethnic identities. Such identity is necessary for basic social solidarity, and it goes far beyond simple constitutional patriotism, Miller claims.
A skeptic could note the following. However, multi-cultural states typically bring together groups with very different histories, languages, religions, even quite contrasting appearances. One seems to have a dilemma. Grounding social solidarity in national identity requires the latter to be rather thin and seems likely to end up as full-on, unitary cultural identity. Thick constitutional patriotism may be the only possible attitude that can ground such solidarity while preserving the original cultural diversity.
Arguments in the second set concern political justice and do not rely on metaphysical claims about identity, flourishing and cultural values. They appeal to actual or alleged circumstances that would make nationalist policies reasonable or permissible or even mandatory , such as a the fact that a large part of the world is organized into nation states so that each new group aspiring to create a nation-state just follows an established pattern , or b the circumstances of group self-defense or of redressing past injustice that might justify nationalist policies to take a special case.
Some of the arguments also present nationhood as conducive to important political goods, such as equality. A group of people of a sufficient size has a prima facie right to govern itself and decide its future membership, if the members of the group so wish. It is fundamentally the democratic will of the members themselves that grounds the right to an ethno-national state and to ethno-centric cultural institutions and practices.
This argument presents the justification of ethno- national claims as deriving from the will of the members of the nation. It is therefore highly suitable for liberal nationalism but not appealing to a deep communitarian who sees the demands of the nation as independent from, and prior to, the choices of particular individuals. For extended discussion of this argument, see Buchanan , which has become a contemporary classic; Moore ; and Gans For some exchanges of arguments, see J.
An interesting volume from a legal perspective is Kohen , and some interesting case studies are presented in Casertano For an extremely negative judgment see Yack , Ch. Oppression and injustice give the victimized group a just cause and the right to secede. If a minority group is oppressed by the majority to the extent that almost every minority member is worse off than most members of the majority simply in virtue of belonging to the minority, then nationalist claims on behalf of the minority are morally plausible and potentially compelling.
This argument implies a restrictive answer to our questions 2b and 2c : the use of force in order to achieve sovereignty is legitimate only in the cases of self-defense and redress. Of course, there is a whole lot of work to be done specifying against whom force may legitimately be used, and how much damage may be done to how many. It establishes a typical remedial right, acceptable from a liberal standpoint. See the discussion in Kukathas and Poole , also Buchanan For past injustices see Waldron Members of a minority group are often disadvantaged in relation to a dominant culture because they have to rely on those with the same language and culture to conduct the affairs of daily life.
Since freedom to conduct one's daily life is a primary good, and it is difficult to change or give up reliance upon one's minority culture to attain that good, this reliance can lead to certain inequalities if special measures are not taken. Spontaneous nation-building by the majority has to be moderated. Therefore, liberal neutrality itself requires that the majority provide certain basic cultural goods, i. See Kymlicka b, and Institutional protections and the right to the minority group's own institutional structure are remedies that restore equality and turn the resulting nation-state into a more moderate multicultural one.
See Kymlicka , We note an interesting recent proposal by Robert E. Goodin , who distinguishes two motivations for multiculturalism and two possible resultant kinds: polyglot multiculturalism and protective multiculturalism. The nation-state has in the past succeeded in promoting equality and democracy. Liberalism informs the notion of individual agency, but provides weak purchase at best on membership and on the collective cohesion and capacity of the demos.
Ethno-national solidarity is a powerful motive for a more egalitarian distribution of goods Miller , Canovan , The nation-state also seems to be essential to safeguard the moral life of communities in the future, since it is the only form of political institution capable of protecting communities from the threats of globalization and assimilationism. For a detailed critical discussion of this argument see Mason Calhoun himself is acutely aware of the limitations of his praise of nationalism, mentioning some on the same page as that from which we quoted above.
Roshwald in his book, which cited the paradoxical and contradictory nature of nationalist claims. To quote a fine summary given by A. Greenfeld herself is very critical of nationalism, but someone might contemplate incorporating her theory cleansed of her critical attitude into a defense of nationalism.
These political arguments can be combined with deep communitarian ones. The idea of moderate nation-building points to an open multi-culturalism, in which every group receives its share of remedial rights but, instead of walling itself off from others, participates in a common, overlapping civic culture and in open communication with other sub-communities.
Given the variety of pluralistic societies and intensity of trans-national interactions, such openness seems to many to be the only guarantee of stable social and political life see the debate in Shapiro and Kymlicka The only solution seems to be extreme moderation. The dialectics of moderating nationalist claims in the context of pluralistic societies might thus lead to a stance respectful of cultural differences, but liberal and potentially cosmopolitan in its ultimate goals. The liberal nationalist stance is mild and civil, and there is much to be said in favor of it.
It tries to reconcile our intuitions in favor of some sort of political protection of cultural communities with a liberal political morality. Of course, this raises issues of compatibility between liberal universal principles and the particular attachments to one's ethno-cultural nation. Very liberal nationalists such as Tamir divorce ethno-cultural nationhood from statehood. Also, the kind of love for country they suggest is tempered by all kinds of universalist considerations, which in the last instance trump national interest Tamir , ; see also Moore and Gans There is an ongoing debate among philosophical nationalists about how much weakening and compromising is still compatible with a stance's being nationalist at all.
For example, Canovan ch. For a more sociological approach to the dialectic of the global and the ethno-national, see the Introduction to Delanty and Kumar and Delanty's contribution to that volume. In recent years issues of nationalism have been increasingly integrated into the debate about the international order see the entries on globalization and cosmopolitanism. The main conceptual link is the claim that nation-states are natural, stable and suitable units of the international order.
A related debate concerns the role of minorities in the processes of globalization see Kaldor, Moreover, the two approaches might ultimately converge: a multiculturalist liberal nationalism and a moderate, difference-respecting cosmopolitanism have a lot in common. One investigation in this direction has been undertaken by Kok-Chor Tan , see in particular ch.
However, he is quite skeptical about the convergence in his later paper see also his book. Let me start by briefly returning to the recent debates on territory and nation and then pass to issues of global justice. She nevertheless stresses that more than one ethnic group can have formative ties to a given territory, and that there might be competing claims based on settlement.
Yack , ff starts from the same point to derive much more pessimistic conclusions. But, given the ethno-national conflicts of the twentieth century, one can safely assume that culturally plural states divided into isolated and closed sub-communities glued together merely by arrangements of modus vivendi are inherently unstable. Stability might therefore require that the pluralist society envisioned by liberal culturalists promote quite intense intra-state interaction between cultural groups in order to forestall mistrust, reduce prejudice, and create a solid basis for cohabitation.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, more cosmopolitan authors Buchanan , Waldron , Other Internet Resources also point to the fact of multiple settlements in roughly the same territory and to the importance of the proximity of various ethno-cultural groups. They stress internal cultural pluralism: for reasons of peace and security, state borders should bring together distinct cultural groups typically ethno-national ones , and they in fact most often do so.
Combining the cultural motivation to foster open multiculturalism and Waldron's security-based motivation to structure states for the purpose of resolving conflicts and establishing justice, forming a state becomes a duty we owe to anyone with whom we are likely to come into endemic conflict. Waldron , Other Internet Resources. But where should one stop? The question arises since there are a lot of geographically open, interacting territories of various sizes.
The cosmopolitan logic regarding the interests of peace and security therefore suggests joining together bigger and bigger units in a kind of recursive scheme. For instance, the EU was created to secure lasting peace, and other supra-statal and macro-regional might follow its lead. Ultimately, the combination of ethno-cultural and security-focused considerations might thus point in a clearly cosmopolitan direction when formulating and resolving dilemmas about matters of territory. This brings us to the wider issue concerning cosmopolitanism. What are the obligations of nations and nation-states towards neighbors, and even more distant Others?
This issue is regaining prominence in recent debates on nationalism. Again, see the entries on globalization and cosmopolitanism. Since the present entry is on nationalism, we stress the pro-national accounts, taking Miller , as our paradigm. In principle one might think of intermediate positions falling between two extremes: on one extreme, completely closed nation-states, like in Fichte's early nineteenth century utopia of Closed commercial state ; on the other, completely opened borders, like in the arrangement proposed by Joseph Carens However, the tough nationalistic line is no longer proposed seriously in ethical debates, so the furthest pro-national extreme is in fact a relatively moderate stance, exemplified by Miller in the works listed.
Here is a typical proposal of his concerning global justice based on nation states:. A similar proposal might work for the reduction of the emission of greenhouse gasses, he continues. It is a challenging idea, and a critic might ask how it would fare under normal circumstances. Imagine the proposal is accepted by leading industrial countries, and each chooses its beneficiaries. Suppose a benefactor state B1 adopts a beneficiary state C1 and proceeds to deliver aid.
What if a political faction in C1 that is hostile to B1 pushes its co-nationals to turn to some other benefactor? Similarly, if B1 needed international support in its dealings with some other powerful country B2, it would certainly count on C1 to give it. This arrangement is beginning to look somewhat colonial. Even worse things might happen in a situation of economic crisis: if B1 has been feeding C1 for ten years, during a crisis it might become greedy for C1's resources; what would prevent it from blackmailing C1?
So much for issues of aid. On the opposite extreme one finds strong cosmopolitans, like Thomas Pogge, who blame the global order for injustices committed against the poor and recommend a considerable redistribution of goods as a remedy to restore justice. In between we find authors like Mathias Risse , who proposes a highly structured conception of justice that preserves the statist order of international politics but accepts common ownership of the Earth and places considerable duties on states: inequalities are allowed, but only if all inhabitants of the Earth have enough to satisfy their basic needs.
Miller has also put forward the most thoughtful pro-nationalist proposal concerning immigration. His proposal allows refugees to seek asylum temporarily until the situation in their country of origin improves; it also limits economic migration. Miller argues against the defensibility of a global standard for equality, opportunity, welfare, etc. As mentioned, the opposite extreme is occupied by those like Joseph Carens who defend completely open borders. Many recent views seem to converge to the middle ground. Christiano, for example, proposes working from the relatively just system of existing norms that oblige cooperation between states.
He thinks that the right way to proceed is to negotiate consensus agreements satisfying individual beneficiary and benefactor states as well as international legal norms. A poor state might send a number of workers to a rich state on a temporary basis; these workers would then return to their country of origin to foster development. International law would provide a framework of legitimacy, and negotiations between states would provide concrete, and hopefully just, solutions.
The philosophy of nationalism nowadays does not concern itself much with the aggressive and dangerous form of invidious nationalism that often occupies center stage in the news and in sociological research. Although this pernicious form can be of significant instrumental value in mobilizing oppressed people and restoring their sense of dignity, its moral costs are usually taken by philosophers to outweigh its benefits.
Nationalist philosophers distance themselves from such aggressive forms of nationalism and mainly seek to construct and defend very moderate versions; these have therefore come to be the main focus of recent philosophical debate. The debate carries an interesting methodological message overlooked in the literature. Authors defending the importance of ethno-national and cultural considerations standardly point to their enormous practical impact, and underlying factual, social and historical factors.
It is no wonder that the prominent pro-nationalist thinker D. Miller insists on the importance of social and historical facts for political philosophy and moral decisions , chapters 1 and 2. Indeed, when drawing from the usual resources for theorizing in political philosophy — principles, facts including presumed facts , and intuitions from thought experiments — cosmopolitan authors typically stress the importance of principles, while pro-nationalists stress that of facts.
In presenting the claims that nationalists defend, we have proceeded from the more radical towards more liberal nationalist alternatives. In examining the arguments for these claims, we have presented metaphysically demanding communitarian arguments resting upon deep communitarian assumptions about culture, such as the premise that the ethno-cultural nation is the most important community for all individuals. This is an interesting and respectable claim, but its plausibility has not yet been established. The moral debate about nationalism has resulted in various weakenings of culture-based arguments, proposed by liberal nationalists, which render the arguments less ambitious but much more plausible.
Having abandoned the old nationalist ideal of a state owned by a single dominant ethno-cultural group, liberal nationalists have become receptive to the idea that identification with a plurality of cultures and communities is important for a person's social identity. They have equally become sensitive to trans-national issues and more willing to embrace a partly cosmopolitan perspective. Liberal nationalism has also brought to the fore more modest, less philosophically or metaphysically charged arguments grounded in concerns about justice.
Liberal culturalists such as Kymlicka have proposed minimal and pluralistic versions of nationalism built around such arguments. In these minimal versions, the project of building classical nation-states is tempered or abandoned and replaced by a more sensitive form of national identity that can thrive in a multicultural society. This new project, however, might demand a further widening of our moral perspectives. The twentieth century has taught us that culturally-plural states divided into isolated and closed sub-communities glued together only by arrangements of mere modus vivendi are inherently unstable.
Stability might therefore require that the plural society envisioned by liberal culturalists promote quite intense interaction between cultural groups in order to forestall mistrust, reduce prejudice and create a solid basis for cohabitation. On the other hand, as noted above in connection with issues of territorial justice, once membership in multiple cultures and communities is legitimized, social groups will spread beyond the borders of a single state e. The internal dialectic driven by concern for ethno-cultural identity might in this way lead to pluralistic and potentially cosmopolitan political arrangements that are rather distant from what was classically understood as nationalism.
This is a short list of books on nationalism that are readable and useful introductions to the literature. First, two contemporary classics of social science with opposing views are:. The two best recent anthologies of high-quality philosophical papers on the morality of nationalism are:.
Interesting critical analyses of group solidarity in general and nationalism in particular, written in the traditions of rational choice theory and motivation analysis, are:. There is a wide offering of interesting sociological and political science work on nationalism, which is beginning to be summarized in:.
The most readable short anthology of brief papers for and against cosmopolitanism and nationalism by leading authors in the field is:. What is a Nation? Varieties of Nationalism 2.
- Biomedical Sensors and Instruments, Second Edition.
- Maktub (Spanish Edition).
- Simulacra (Spanish Edition).
The Moral Debate 3. First, the descriptive ones: 1a What is a nation and what is national identity? Second, the normative ones: 1e Is the attitude of caring about national identity always appropriate? They raise an important issue: 2a Does political sovereignty within or over a territory require statehood or something weaker? Once this has been discussed, we can turn to the related normative issues: 2b What actions are morally permitted to achieve sovereignty and to maintain it? Let me characterize these briefly: Nationalism in a wider sense is any complex of attitudes, claims and directives for action ascribing a fundamental political, moral and cultural value to nation and nationality and deriving obligations for individual members of the nation, and for any involved third parties, individual or collective from this ascribed value.
The philosophically most important variations concern three aspects of such normative claims: i The normative nature and strength of the claim: does it promote merely a right say, to have and maintain a form of political self-government, preferably and typically a state, or have cultural life centered upon a recognizably ethno-national culture , or a moral obligation to get and maintain one , or a moral, legal and political obligation?
To put it more officially Universalizing nationalism is the political program that claims that every ethno-nation should have a state that it should rightfully own and the interests of which it should promote. The deep communitarian perspective is a theoretical perspective on political issues in the case under consideration, on nationalism that justifies a given political arrangement here, a nation-state by appeal to deep philosophical assumptions about human nature, language, community ties and identity in a deeper, philosophical sense.
But here is a sample from Margalit, whose last sentence has been already quoted above: The idea is that people make use of different styles to express their humanity. The styles are generally determined by the communities to which they belong. By cosmopolitanism I shall understand a moral and political doctrine of the following sort: Cosmopolitanism is the view that one's primary moral obligations are directed to all human beings regardless of geographical or cultural distance , and political arrangements should faithfully reflect this universal moral obligation in the form of supra-statist arrangements that take precedence over nation-states.
For example, Nielsen writes: We are, to put it crudely, lost if we cannot identify ourselves with some part of an objective social reality: a nation, though not necessarily a state, with its distinctive traditions. What we find in people — and as deeply embedded as the need to develop their talents — is the need not only to be able to say what they can do but to say who they are.
This is found, not created, and is found in the identification with others in a shared culture based on nationality or race or religion or some slice or amalgam thereof…. Under modern conditions, this securing and nourishing of a national consciousness can only be achieved with a nation-state that corresponds to that national consciousness , We are forbidden to make judgments of comparative value, for that is measuring the incommensurable.
Smith: For Roshwald, nationalism is at once ancient and very modern; it employs twin conceptions of time, cyclical and linear; it seeks self-determination while manifesting a sense of victimhood; it insists on the nation's particularity of chosenness while claiming a universal mission; and finally, it reveals a symbiosis of kindred and mingled blood, of ethnic and civic nationhood.
Through these antinomies, nationalism is constantly able to renew itself and adapt to different situations …. Here is a typical proposal of his concerning global justice based on nation states: It might become a matter of national pride to have set aside a certain percentage of GDP for developmental goals — perhaps for projects in one particular country or group of countries ….
Conclusion The philosophy of nationalism nowadays does not concern itself much with the aggressive and dangerous form of invidious nationalism that often occupies center stage in the news and in sociological research.
Bibliography The Beginner's Guide to the Literature This is a short list of books on nationalism that are readable and useful introductions to the literature. First, two contemporary classics of social science with opposing views are: Gellner, E.